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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
October 30, 1981 Conference
List 1 , Sheet 4
No.

81-419

Cert to the Texas Court of -----Criminal Appeals (Clinton,
Roberts and Odom)

TEXAS

v.
BROWN
Timely

State/Criminal

SUMMARY:

Whether the court below erred in holding that

despite a police officer's professional judgment that a balloon
contained illegal drugs, he may not
doctrine to seize the balloon.
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FACTS:

2 -

During the course of a routine, fixed-location

driver's license check, an officer saw the Respondent pull from
his pocket and drop to his seat an opaque, tied-off balloon.

As

the Respondent opened the glove compartment, the officer observed
numerous plastic vials, additional loose balloons, and loose
white powder (which turned out to be milk sugar}.

The officer

then ordered the Respondent out of the car and seized the balloon
on the car seat.

Based on his conclusion from a cursory

inspection that the balloon contained a powdery substance, and
based on his experiences as an officer, he arrested the
Respondent for drug law violations.

Subsequent chemical analysis showed that the balloon
~ ~

contained heroin.

The trial court denied the Respondent's motion

to suppress the evidence, and he entered a plea of nolo
contendere.

HOLDING:

The Court of Criminal Appeals overturned the

conviction, holding that under Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

u.s.

443 (1971), the seizure was unlawful.

According to the

court below, one of the three elements of the plain view doctrine
requires that "it must be immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them."

Because the officer could not

testify what, if anything, was in the opaque balloon, he had not
sufficient grounds to believe that he was seizing contraband.

..
- 3 -

Although the panel opinion was unanimous, three judges
dissented from the denial of leave to file a motion for
rehearing.

Principally, they argued that an officer relying on

years of practical experience had probable cause to believe that
the balloon contained illegal drugs.

In support of their

position, the dissenting judges pointed to cases from other state
and federal jurisdictions holding that tied-off balloons (and
other drug related objects) in plain view can be lawfully seized.

CONTENTIONS:
1.

The Petitioner first argues that the decision below

conflicts with Coolidge v. United States, 403
and United States v. Cortez, 101

u.s.

s. Ct. 690 (1981).

443 (1971),
In Coolidge,

a plurality of this Court wrote that an item could be seized
without a warrant under the plain view doctrine "only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them."

403 U.S. at 466.

Since, an experienced police officer

would immediately realize that the Respondent's balloon contained
illegal drugs, the seizure was lawful.

In Cortez, this Court

made clear that an officer's experience is a legitimate factor in
deciding whether he has probable cause to act.

Other cases,

while not involving the plain view doctrine, have made clear that
the "contents [of some containers] can be inferred from their
outward appearance."
(1979).

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442

u.s.

753, 764 n.l3

See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1981).

The Petitioner emphasizes that an officer need not be certain of
the balloon's contents before he may act.

See Payton v. New

- 4 -

York, 445

u.s.

573, 587 (1980)

(holding that the seizure of

private property in plain view is presumptively reasonable,
"assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property
with criminal activity").

2.

The Petitioner also urges this Court to grant its

petition because the decision below conflicts with the decisions
of other state courts.

3.

The Respondent opposes granting the petition, insisting

that the decision below was based on state law, and not on the
Fourth Amendment.

DISCUSSION:

A review of the petition below and the cases

cited indicates that the decision was based on the Fourth
Amendment, and not on Texas law.

Nowhere in the opinion below,

or in the cases cited, does the Texas court refer to Texas
statutes or constitutional provisions.

To the extent that it believed that its holding was
compelled by decisions of this Court, the Texas court erred.
While the decision below does not conflict squarely with any
holdings of this Court, it certainly ignores some of this Court's
recent opinions.

And as the Petitioner argues, other courts do

not hesitate to hold that tied-off balloons and similar objects
in plain view may be seized if in the officer's experience the
objects are evidence of criminal activity.

- 5 -

Nevertheless, I am not sure this case is certworthy.

The

effect of the decision below is limited to Texas, and the court
may have rul~ differently if the officer had slightly more
information before seizing the balloon.

I recommend denial.

There is a response.

10/14/81
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 9, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

1)

Cases held for United States v. Ross,
No. 80-2209

Texas v. Brown,

No.~i:)

In this case the State of Texas seeks review of a
decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. That court
ruled that the trial court erred in denying respondent's
motion to suppress evidence.
Respondent's automobile was stopped as part of a
"routine and nonrandom license check." When asked to
produce his driver's license, respondent put his hand into
the right front pocket of his trousers.
After fumbling
inside the pocket, respondent withdrew a dollar bill that
was partialiy folded and "a small gr e en balloon stuck
between his fing e rs." Still seeking his driver's license,
respondent looked into the glove compartment of his car. As
he did so the investigating officer saw some empty plastic
vials, a white powdery substance that was later determined
not to be a controlled substance, and a bag of party
balloons. At some point, r e spo~dent dropped the green
balloon onto the s e at of the car. · The officer ordered
respondent to get out of the car; he then r e ached into the
car and seized the green balloon. The balloon contained
heroin. No warrant had been obtained.
The trial court denied a motion to suppress. On
appeal, the State argued that the warrantless search was
justified under the "plain view" doctrine. A three-judge
panel of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed.
It
stated that it did not question either the validity of the
officer's initial stop of respondent's vehicle or "the
propriety of the arrest since [respondent] failed to produce

N~ ~ ~ss c.o-U- .

-

\)~1-t~~~~~~~e.IS~~
~ ~ f!Jv.. ·~

-

2 -

a driver's license." The court rejected the State's "plain view" argument, howev~r, on the ground that the allegedly
incriminating contents of the balloon--unlike the balloon
itself--were not in plain view. The court analogized the
seizure of the balloon to a seizure of a translucent vial or
photographic negative.
The State petitioned for rehearing en bane. The court
denied the motion, with three judges dissenting. The
dissenting judges believed that, since the balloon itself
was in plain view, a warrantless seizure was justified if
the officer had probable cause to believe that it was
connected with criminal activity. They found such probable
cause pr e sent in this case; "the permissible d e duction that
[a tied-off balloon] is commonly linked to heroin forms a
legitimate basis to the trained law enforc e ment officer for
suspicion."
Although this case involves the search of a
"container," it is not affected by our decision in Ross.
It
was unnecessary in Ross to adopt an "unworthy container"
exception to the warrant requirement. There is no
suggestion in this case that the officer had probable cause
to search respondent's vehicle; our analysis in Ross is thus
inapplicable. Nor does the State contend that the search
was justified as incident to respondent's arrest. This case
does present, however, the question of just how
"incriminating" an object must be to justify a warrantless
search under the plain view doctrine. Although that is not
an insubstantial question, I am inclin
to defer to the
state court's appraisal of the incr· 1 atrn character of
balloons in Texas.
I will
aeny.
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Michael F. Sturley

Question Presented
Does the Fourth Amendment permit the warrantless seizure
of a tied-off balloon that a police officer lawfully observes in
plain view, when the officer was aware of previous cases in which
heroin was carried in such balloons?

bench memo: Tex - , v. Brown

page 2.

I.
A.

Background

Facts
The

essential

facts

appear

to be

On

undisputed.

the

evening of June 18, 1979, the Fort Worth police set up a routine,
nonrandom license checkpoint.
ples

stopped

resp' s

At about 11:00 p.m., Officer Ma-

automobile

and

L
- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

driver's license.
there

asked

resp

to produce

Resp put his hand in his pocket, and kept it

long enough to worry the officer.

The officer

shined his flashlight into the car at resp's hand.

-

his

therefore

Resp partial-

ly removed his hand from his pocket, allowing Officer Maples to
..........

see

a

dropped

tied-off

--

the

compartment,

._,u

balloon
••

--

between
,....

resp's

.............................

middle

fingers.

-,

balloon to the car seat and rummaged
where

Officer

Maples

was

able

-

in the glove

to see

some

plastic vials, some white powder, and a bag of balloons.
about a minute

Resp

small
After

resp told Officer Maples that he was unable to

find his license, so the officer requested resp to get out of the
car.

After resp did so, Officer Maples saw the tied-off balloon

on the car seat and seized it.

The balloon was later found to

contain heroin.

B.

Decisions Below
Resp was charged with possession of heroin.

He moved to

suppress the evidence seized from the car, particularly the tiedoff balloon.

The TC, after a hearing, denied the motion.

Pre-

serving his right to appeal the suppression decision, resp pleaded nolo contendere to the charge and was sentenced to four years
imprisonment.

bench memo: Tex - , v. Brown

page 3.

On appeal the Tex. Ct. Crim. App. reversed, holding that
it was not "immediately apparent" to Officer Maples that the balloon contained contraband,
warrant
being

requirement

similar

to a

did

-

so the "flain view" exception to the

not

plastic

apply.
bag,

translucent vial--the objects

in

It

a

treated

the

balloon as

photographic negative,

three previous cases

or a

in which

the Texas courts had held the plain view exception inapplicable.

II.
Much of
purposes.
the

the

Discussion

argument

in

this case has

been at cross-

Resp devotes most of his brief to the argument that

decision

be low was

based on

state

Since

law.

this

issue

should have been resolved at the cert petn stage, the State did
not even address it in its principal brief.
fra.

The State and the SG,

their

attention

to

on the other hand,

the proper

legal

in-

devote much of

standard under

Amendment--an issue on which resp concedes.
fra.

See part II.A,

the Fourth

See part II.B,

in-

In the end, the key question is whether the arresting offi-

cer had probable cause to believe that the balloon contained narcotics.

~

~

See part II.C, infra.

~ ~1-c..· J.c -

A.

The Basis of the Lower Court's
I

•

•

ReSp s pr1nc1pa

1

. . r:U • •• ~ II'('T..£,/ t:. 1/~
Dec1s1on ~~ •• ~v~
•

~~~,.j.

argument 1s that the~~.w~s~

based on state law, and thus is not reviewable here.
tention was considered at the cert petn stage
jected.

The Tex.

Ct.

Crim.

App.

This con-

~df~-

applied the Fourth Amendment,

and gave no indication of relying on state law.

1

bench memo: Tex

v. Brown

~

page 4.

The only mention of any constitutional provision in the
opinion below is in the summary of resp's contentions:
In [resp' s] sole ground of error he complains that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because the evidence was seized in contravention of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and
the Texas Constitution, Article I, §9.
Petn A-1.

In its resolution of the plain view issue, the court

relied on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), for the
statement of

the

general

rule.

It

then

relied

on

four

state

cases to clarify the rule and explain its application: Howard v.
State, 599 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); DeLao v. State, 550
S.W.2d 289
730

(Tex.

(Tex.
Crim.

Crim. App.
App.

1977);

1977);

Duncan v. State,

Nicholas v.

State,

549 S.W.2d

502 S.W.2d 169

(Tex. Crim. App. 1973) .1
On the basis of a

simple

"case count"

it might appear

that the decision below is based primarily on state law, but the
treatment of the plain view issue in the four state cases disproves the theory.

Nicholas,

the earliest of

the four,

relied

only on Coolidge, the federal case, for its concusion that photographic negatives

in plain view could

plain view exception. 2

not be seized under

the

DeLao and Duncan, which were decided just

1 The court also cited Taylor v. State, 599 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1967). It cannot be said to have relied on Taylor for
the proposition at issue here, however, since Taylor upheld a
plain view seizure.
In any event, Taylor itself relied primarily
on federal law.
2 Nicholas also cited four decisions of the Tex. Ct. Crim. App.
that upheld plain view seizures.
None of these cases suggests
any limitation on the plain view exception, let alone a limitation unique to state law.

bench memo:

-

Tex - ~

page 5.

v. Brown

two weeks apart, each relied on Coolidge, the federal case, and
Nicholas,

the

state case

based on Coolidge. 3

Finally,

Howard

relied principally on Coolidge and the other three state cases. 4
The relationships among these cases are rather like the
relationships among

the royal

families of Europe.

Just as

the

royal blood line always leads back to Queen Victoria, the legal
rationale

underlying

the Tex.

Ct.

Crim.

App. 's

suppression of

evidence seized under the plain view doctrine always leads back
to Coolidge.

There is no suggestion in any of these cases that

the court is also relying on state law.

This Court is justified

in concluding that only the Fourth Amendment was involved.

B.

The Proper Legal Standard
By

now

there

should

be

1 it tle

doubt

that

the Fourth

Amendment permits the police to seize property in plain view if,
among

other

things,

"there

is probable cause

property with criminal activity."
573, 587
v.

(1980)

Bannister,

(dicta).
449

u.s.

to associate

Payton v. New York, 445

the

u.s.

Justice Stewart's opinion in Colorado
1

(1980)

(per curiam),

is particularly

3 rn discussing the plain view issue, DeLao also cited Jackson
v. State, 489 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), which upheld the
seizure of marijuna in plain view.
4 Howard also relied on Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1976), in which the court found that marijuana seized by the
police had not been in plain view as a factual matter.
Kolb, in
turn, relied on five state cases for the existence of the plain
view exception, but it cited no authority for the invalidity of
the seizure. There is certainly no indication in Kolb that state
law places a more severe restriction on the plain view doctrine
than that found in Coolidge.

~

-

-

_

...... -

relevant here.

-

..

-~

.

-

........ &

In Bannister, a police officer stopped an automo-

bile to issue a traffic citation and saw some chrome lug nuts and
two lug wrenches

in plain view.

description of property

Since these i terns rna tched the

just stolen in the area,

and since the

occupants of the car matched the description of the suspects in
the robbery,

he had probable cause to arrest the occupants and

seize the stolen property.
Resp
stand~d

concedes

jo_S _plain

that

view

seizures

~~_.

Brief
much

9,

13,

higher

23.

The Tex.

standard.

probable

It

Ct.
took

cause

under

Crim.

is

the

App.,

Coolidge's

the

appropriate

Fourth

Amendment.

however,

applied a

phrase

"immediately

apparent to the police that they have evidence before them," 403
/

U.S., at 466, out of context and required the State to prove that
the arresting officer "kn[e]w" that there was incriminating evidence in the balloon when he seized it.

At the very least, the

Court should correct this error.

C.

The Application of the Probable Cause Standard
The

TC

denied

the

suppression

motion,

clear that it did so on the proper grounds.
better

if

the TC explicitly had

probable

cause

balloon,

but here

alone.

to

found

but

it

is

not

It would have been

that Officer Maples had

believe

that narcotics were

I

the Court can reach that conclusion

think

in

the

tied-off

Officer Maples testified that he once had made an arrest

in a case where narcotics were carried in balloons such as the
one at issue here.

He had also heard of similar cases from other

~· ·-- ""

•••-- -•-.,.,-- •

""" "-~~ g

v

•

~.&..V¥'111

officers. 5

Even the Tex.

balloon

a

is

Ct.

common container

Crim. App.
for

has recognized that a

carrying

illegal

narcotics.

See DeLao v. State, supra.
What is even more important, there does not seem to be
any i\..
innocent

"
i tern

tied-off balloon.
they

give

the

that

is

commonly

carried

in an

uninflated,

(Air, water, and helium are all innocent, but

balloon

a

different

appearance

than

narcotics.)

This case is thus very different from those on which the Tex. Ct.
Crim. App. relied.

Photographic negatives commonly contain inno-

cent pictures, not evidence of crime.
though

Cf. Nicholas, supra.

"bagg ies" are common containers

for

narcotics,

used even more frequently for innocent food.

Al-

they are

Cf. Duncan, supra.

Finally, pill containers are used not only for illegal drugs but
legitimate prescriptions.

Cf. Howard, supra.

Here Officer Maples plainly viewed an uninflated, tiedoff balloon with something inside.

Narcotics are commonly car-

ried in this way, but innocent items rarely are.

Under the cir-

cumstances, he had probable cause to believe that there were narcotics in the balloon.
Resp's arguments to the contrary are nothing more than
an attempt to impose a standard higher than probable cause.

He

points out that no one could tell what was in the balloon without
subjecting

the

contents

to chemical

analyis.

this is true, the argument proves too much.

Brief

7.

While

Even if the heroin

5 This is resp's interpretation of the Maples testimony.
Brief 6. The testimony itself is not a model of clarity.

See

. ~~~~-- -------

- - ----- -

..

-

---·--

¥

•

_ . . _ ....., ... ... ..

itself had been in plain view, the officer would not know what it
was without chemical analysis.

The point, of course, is that the

officer does not have to know that he is seizing an illegal drug.
This

is the mistake that the Tex.

Ct.

Crim.

App.

made.

It

is

enough if he has probable cause to believe that what he is seizing is an illegal drug.

Officer Maples had that probable cause

here.

III.

Conclusion

Although the Tex. Ct. Crim. App. would be free on remand
to reaffirm its earlier decision on state law grounds, the decision below was based on the Fifth Amendment.
Amendment standard here
dard.

The proper Fifth

is admittedly the probable cause stan-

Under the circumstances of this case, the arresting offi-

cer had the probable cause necessary to justify the seizure at
issue.

..

The decision below should be reversed .
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~~ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
?

No. 81-419

TEXAS, PETITIONER v. CLIFFORD JAMES BROWN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS OF TEXAS
[February - , 1983]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Clifford James Brown was convicted in the
District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, for possession of
heroin in violation of state law. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that evidence introduced at his trial should have been suppressed because it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 1 That court rejected the state's con1
Brown argues that the decision below rested on an independent and adequate state ground, and therefore that this Court lacks jurisdiction. Fox
Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). The position is untenable. The opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rests squarely on
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in Coolidge v. N ew Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), and on
Texas cases interpreting that decision, e. g., Howard v. State, 599 S.W. 2d
597 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979); DeLao v. State, 550 S.W. 2d 289 (Tex.Cr.App.
1977); Duncan v. State , 549 S.W. 2d 730 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); and Nicholas
v. State, 502 S. W. 2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973). The only mention of the
Texas Constitution occurs in a summary of Brown's contentions at the outset of the lower court's opinion. In a field like thP- Fourth Amendment,
~e the federal courts have been so active in imposing standards on state
and local activities, a more affirmative indication in the opinion of the state
court of reliance on state law is necessary before we will reject the likely
explanation that "the [state] court felt compelled by what it understood to
be federal constitutional considerations" to reach the result it did.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 568 (1977).
Brown relies principally on Howard v. State, supra, and Duncan v.
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tention that the so-called "plain view" doctrine justified the
police seizure. Because of apparent uncertainty concerning
the scope and applicability of this doctrine, we granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - , and now reverse the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals.
On a summer evening in June, 1979, Harold Maples, an officer of the Fort Worth police force, assisted in setting up a
routine driver's license checkpoint on East Allen Street in
thatcrtY~Si10rtiYberOreiiiliii1lght Maples stopped an automobile driven by respondent Brown, who was alone. Standing alongside the driver's window of Brown's car, Maples
asked him for his driver's license. At roughly the same
time, Maples shined his flashlight into the car and saw Brown
withdraw his right hand from his right pants pocket.
Caught between the two middle fingers of the hand was an
opaque, green party balloon, knotted about one half inch
from the tip. Brown let the balloon fall to the seat beside his
leg, and then reached across the passenger seat and opened
the glove compartment.
Because of his previous experience in arrests for drug offenses, Maples testified that he was aware that narcotics fre-

-

State, supra. Neither decision supports the proposition that the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals based its decision upon state law. In Howard ,
the State argued that the plain view doctrine justified the seizure of a
closed translucent medicine jar from an automobile. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the claim, relying on Coolidge v. New Hampshire ,
supra, and stating that the State's arguments "cannot be squared with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the plain view doctrine." 599 S.W. 2d,
at 602. The court also relied on Thomas v. State, supra, which it characterized as "[f]ollowing the teachings of Coolidge v. New Hampshire." I d.
An additional opinion of the court on the State's Motion for Rehearing
merely elaborated upon the application of the plain view doctrine set forth
in the court's original opinion. Similarly, in Duncan, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the State's reliance on the plain view theory, citing to
Coolidge for a statement of the applicable law, as well as to Nicholas v.
State, 502 S.W. 2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973). Like the court's other decisions in the area, N icholas relied only on Coolidge.
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quently were packaged in balloons like the one in Brown's
hand. When he saw the balloon, Maples shifted his position
in order to obtain a better view of the interior of the glove
compartment. He noticed that it contained several small
plastic vials, quantities of loose white powder, and an open
bag of party balloons. After rummaging briefly through the
glove compartment, Brown told Maples that he had no driver's license in his possession. Maples then instri.ieted him to
get out onhe car and stand at its rear. Brown complied,
and, before following him to the rear of the car, Maples
reached into the car and picked up the green balloon; there
seemed to be a sort of powdery substance within the tied-off
portion of the balloon.
Maples then displayed the balloon to a fellow officer who
indicated that he "understood the situation." The two officers then advised Brown that he was under arrest. 2 They

---===-

2

It is not clear on the record before us when Brown was arrested. The
Court of'Cririirnal Appeals stated, at one point in its opinion, that it did not
question "the propriety of the arrest since appellant failed to produce a
driver's license." This statement might be read to suggest that Brown
was arrested upon his failure to produce a license, instead of at some point
following seizure of the balloon from the car. The transcript of the suppression hearing, however, indicates rather clearly that Brown was not
formally arrested until after seizure of the balloon. J. App."'2s::31. In1fie
faceorsuch indications, 1/e declme to uiterpret the above-quoted clause
from the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion as evidencing a belief that an
arrest occurred prior to seizure of the balloon. Rather, we think it likely
that the court was simply reasoning that Brown's arrest, whenever it may
have taken place, was justified because of his failure to produce a driver's
license.
We do not address the argument that seizure of the balloon would have
been justified under New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1982), which permits warrantless searches of the passenger compartment of an automobile
incident to an arrest, because of the absence of clear factual findings regarding the time at which, and the reason for which, Brown was arrested
and because the lower court was not able to consider that decision. Likewise, we do not rest our decision on United States v. Ross,-- U. S. - (1982).
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also conducted an on-the-scene inventory of Brown's car,
discovering several p as 1c ags containing a green leafy substance and a large bottle of milk sugar. These items, like the
balloon, were seized by the officers. At the suppression
hearing conducted by the District Court, a police department
chemist testified that he had examined the substance in the
balloon seized by Maples and determined that it was heroin.
He also testified that narcotics frequently were packaged in
ordinary party balloons.
The Court of Criminal Appeals, discussing the Fourth
Amendment issue, observed that "plain view alone is never
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." Pet.
A-10, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
468 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, Douglas, BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ.) It further concluded that "Officer Maples had to
know that 'incriminatory evidence was before him when he
seized the balloon."' Pet. A-ll (emphasis supplied), quoting
DeLao v. State, 550 S. W. 2d 289, 291 (Tex. Cr. App. 1977).
On the state's petition for rehearing, three judges dissented,
stating their view that "[t]he issue turns on whether an officer, relying on years of practical experience and knowledge
commonly accepted, has probable cause to seize the balloon in
plain view." Pet. A-15, 16.
Because the "plain view" doctrine generally is invoked in
conjunction with other Fourth Amendment principles, such
as those relating to warrants, probable cause, and search incident to arrest, we rehearse briefly these better understood
principles of Fourth Amendment law. That amendment secures the persons, houses, papers and effects of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and requires the
existence of probable cause before a warrant shall issue.
Our c~~es hold that proceduretby wa~ of a warrant is J)referred, although in a wide range otdiverse situations we have
recog:ruzeal1eXI6Ie, common-sense exceptions to this preference.----see, e. g., Warden v. l1ayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967)
(hot pursuit); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51-52

T~C(

-
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(1951) (exigent circumstances); United States v. Ross, - U. S. - - (1982) (automobile search); Chimel v. California,
395 U. S. 752 (1969); United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S.
218 (1973); and New York v. Belton, 453 U .. S. 454 (1982)
(search of person and surrounding area incident to arrest);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973)
(search at border or "functional equivalent"); Zap v. United
States, 328 U. S. 624, 630 (1946) (consent). We have also
held to be permissible intrusions less severe than full-scale
searches or seizures without the necessity of a warrant.
See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, supra, (stop and frisk); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, (seizure for questioning);
Delaware v. Prouse, supra, (roadblock). One frequently
mentioned "exception to the warrant requirement," Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at 443, is the so-called
"plain view" doctrine, relied upon by the state in this case.
While conceding that the green balloon seized by Officer
Maples was clearly visible to him, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the state might not avail itself of the "plain
view" doctrine. That court said:
"For the plain view doctrine to apply, not only must
the officer be legitimately in a position to view the object, but it must be immediately apparent to the police
that they have evidence before them. This 'immediately apparent' aspect is central to the plain view exception and is here relied upon by appellant. (Citation omitted). In this case then, Officer Maples had to know that
'incriminatory evidence was before him when he seized
the balloon."' Petn. A-10, A-11.
The Court of Criminal Appeals based its conclusion primarily
on the plurality opinion of this Court in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, supra. In the Coolidge plur~'s vi~w, the
"plain view" doctrine permits the warrantless seizure by po-

I

I
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lice of private p6ssessions where three requirements are satisfied. 3 First, the police officer must lawfully make an "initial intrusion" or otherwise properly be in a position from
which he can view a particular area. I d., at 465-468. Sec~ the officer must discover incriminating evidence "inadvertently," which is to say, he may not "know in advance the
location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it," relying
on the plain view doctrine only as a pretext. !d., at 470.
Finally, it must be "immediately apparent" to the police that
the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. !d., at 469-470.
While the lower courts generally have applied the Coolidge
plurality's discussion of "plain view," it has never ~oeen e xpressl;r ado,eted by a majority of this Court. On the contrary, the plurality's formulation was sharply criticized at the
time, see, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at
506 (Black, J., dissenting); id., at 51~21 (WHITE, J., dissenting). While not a binding precedent, as the considered
opinion of four Members of this Court it should obviously be
the point of reference for further discussion of the issue.
The Coolidge plurality observed, "It is important to keep
in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence
seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure," simply as "the normal concomitant of any
search, legal or illegal." 403 U. S., at 465. The question
whether property in plain v) ew of the police may ge seized
therefore must turn on thl legality of the intrusio~ that en8

The plurality also remarked that "plain view alone is never enough to
justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
supra, 403 U. S., at 468. The court below appeared to understand this
phrase to impose an independent limitation upon the scope of the plain view
doctrine articulated in Coolidge. The context in which the plurality used
the phrase, however, indicates that it was merely a rephrasing of its conclusion, discussed below, that in order for the plain view doctrine to apply,
a police officer must be engaged in a lawful intrusion or must otherwise
legitimately occupy the position affording him a "plain view."
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ables them to perceive and physically seize the property in
question. The Coolidge plurality, while following this view
of the "plain view" doctrine, characterized the doctrine as an
exception to the warrant requirement. We think this may
be somewhat inaccurate. That characterization, for example, describes application of the doctrine to seizures of property found in public areas very poorly. If police encountered
contraband or evidence of a crime concealed in a public park
few would suggest that the warrant clause had any applicability at all, and reliance upon some "exception" would be
completely unnecessary.
"Plain view" can probably be better understood simply as c;.t+emf't W rtduc.<
an application of the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment to seiZures of property. It is grounded ~&.V"'fl'l ~ndmtJd tv
on the recognition that when a police officer has observed an cjf 11 ,rtt ( ;ea,o.,a&/rfl~~>
object in "plain view," the owner's remaining interests in the
fed' ?
object are merely those of possession and ownership, see
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at 515
(WHITE, J., dissenting). Likewise, it reflects the fact that
requiring police to obtain a warrant once they have obtained
a first-hand perception of contraband, stolen property or incriminating evidence generally would be a "needless inconvenience," 403 U. S., at 468, that might involve danger to the
police and public. I d. We have said previously that "the
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is
judged by balancing its intrusion on ... Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U. S., at 654. In
light of the private and governmental interests just outlined,
our decisions have come to reflect the rule that if, while lawfully engaged in an activity in a particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious object, they may seize it immediately. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S 192 (1927);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 358
(1931); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 465 (1932);
Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 236 (1968); Frazier v.
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Cupp, 394 U. S. 731 (1969).

7

This rule merely reflects an
application of the Fourth Amendment's ~ent
o~ rea~~ss to the law governing seizures of property.
Applyingthese principles, we conclude that Officer Maples
properly seized the green balloon from Brown's automobile.
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that it did not "question ... the validity of the officer's initial stop of appellant's
vehlcle as a part o a license c eck,
et. A-10, and we
agree. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979).
It is likewise beyond dispute that Maples' action in shining
his flashlight to illuminate the interior of Brown's car
trenched upon no right secured to the latter by the Fourth
Amendment. The Court said in United States v. Lee, 274
U. S. 559, 563 (1927), that "[The] use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not
prohibited by the Constitution." Numerous other courts
have agreed that the use of artificial means to illuminate a
darkened area simply does not constitute a search, and thus
triggers no Fourth Amendment protection. 4
Likewise, the fact that Maples "changed [his] position" and
"bent down at an angle so [he] could see what was inside"
Brown's car, J. App., at 16, is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. The general public could peer into the interior of Brown's automobile from any number of angles; there
• E. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1352, 1356--1357, n. 2 (CA 9
1982); United States v. Ocampo, 650 F. 2d 421, 427 (CA 2 1981); United
States v. Pugh, 566 F. 2d 626, 627, n. 2 (CA 81977), cert. denied, 435 U. S.
1010 (1978); United States v. Coplen, 541 F. 2d 211 (CA 9 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1073 (1977); United States v. Lara, 517 F. 2d 209 (CA 5
1975); United States v. Johnson, 506 F. 2d 674 (CA 8 1974), cert. denied,
421 U. S. 917 (1975); United States v. Booker, 461 F. 2d 990, 992 (CA 6
1972); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F. 2d 649 (CA 7 1971); People v.
Waits, 580 P. 2d 391 (Colo. 1978); Redd v. State, 243 S.E. 2d 16 (Ga. 1978);
State v. Chattley, 390 A. 2d 472 (Me. 1978); State v. Vohnoutka, 292
N. W.2d 756 (Minn. 1980); Dick v. State, 596 P. 2d 1265 (Okla.Cr. 1979);
State v. Miller, 608 P. 2d 595 (Ore. 1980); Albo v. State, 379 So. 2d 648
(Fla. 1980).
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is no reason Maples should be precluded from observing as an
officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private citizen. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy, Katz v.
United States, supra, 389 U. S., at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 739-745
(1979), shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile
which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers. In short, the
conduct that enabled Maples to observe the interior of
Brown's car and of his open glove compartment was not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus there can be no dispute here as to the presence of the
first of the three requirements held necessary Ey tne .coolt"'i!{jep ura 1ty to mvoke the "plain view" doctrine. 5 But the
Court of Criminal Appeals, as we have noted, felt the state's
case ran aground on the requirement that the incriminating
nature of the items be "immediately apparent" to the police
officer. To the Court of Appeals, this apparently meant that
the officer must be possessed of near certainty as to the
seizable nature of the items. Decisions by this Court since
Coolidge indicate that the use of the phrase "immediately apparent" was very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it
can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty
as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary for
an application of the "plain view" doctrine.
In Colorado v. Bannister, supra, 449 U. S., at 3--4, we applied what was in substance the plain view doctrine to an offiWhile seizure of the balloon required a warrantless, physical intrusion
into Brown's automobile, this was proper, assuming that the remaining requirements of the plain view doctrine were satisfied. The "Fourth
Amendment protects people not places." Katz v. United States, supra,
389 U. S. , at 351. Officer Maples' action was a limited intrusion, see Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), directed only to retrieving an object
in plain view and not offering the officer an opportunity to engage in the
type of "general exploratory search" condemned in Coolidge. As such, it
was entirely reasonable.
5
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cer's seizure of evidence from an automobile. I d., at n. 4.
The officer noticed that the occupants of the automobile
matched a description of persons suspected of a theft and that
auto parts in the open glove compartment of the car similarly
resembled ones reported stolen. The Court held that these
facts supplied the officer with "probable cause," id., at 4, and
therefore, that he could seize the incriminating items from
the car without a warrant. Plainly, the Court did not view
the "immediately apparent" language of Coolidge as establishing any requirement that a police officer "know" that certain items are contraband or evidence of a crime. Indeed,
Colorado v. Bannister, supra, was merely an application of
the rule, set forth in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573
(1980), that "[t]he seizure o1 property in plain view involves /
I(
no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is robable cause to associate the ro erly
wit crtmma activity." I d., at 587 (emphasis added). We
th~nt of the rule from Payton, supra, requiring probable cause for seizure in the ordinary case, 6 is consistent with the Fourth Amendment and we reaffirm it here.
As the Court frequently has remarked, probable cause is a
1
flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that ~ . VV'(
the facts available to the officer would "warrant a man 0 reates, 267
sonable caution in the belief," Carroll v. ~i d
U. S. 132, 162 (1925), that certain ite
may be contraband
"'t!- prob ·
or stolen property o~ful aS' evidence o a cr~ it does not
""fVlr~ f t 1,~~
demand any showing t at such a beliefoe correct ~ CfPAV () so ~lt~oltO'
~ikely u tte than false. A "practical, nontechnical" probabilfh#l! 5°'
ity that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is re-

(.d. · fill)

J

6
We need not address in this case whether some degree of suspicion
lower than probable cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure in certain
cases. While such seizures would not fit within the "presumptively reasonable>' rule o ayton, which requires the existence of probable cause,
they nenetheless might be reasonable if police were acting in exigent circumstances or where some other important governmental interest is
involved.
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quired. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176
(1949). Moreover, our observation in United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981), regarding "particularized suspicion," is equally applicable to the probable cause
requirement:
"The process does not deal with hard certainties, but
with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities
was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior;
jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same-and
so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence
thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement."
With these considerations in mind it is plain that Officer
Maples possessed probable cause to believe that the balloon
in Brown's hand contained an illicit substance. Maples testified that he was aware, both from his participation in previous narcotics arrests and from discussions with other officers,
that balloons tied in the manner of the one possessed by
Brown were frequently used to carry narcotics. This testimony was corroborated by that of a police department chemist who noted that it was "common" for balloons to be used in
packaging narcotics. In addition, Maples was able to observe the contents of the glove compartment of Brown's car,
which revealed further suggestions that Brown was engaged
in activities that might involve possession of illicit substances. The fact that Maples could not see through the
opaque fabric of the balloon is all but irrelevant: the distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contents-particularly to the trained eye of the officer.
In addition to its statement that for seizure of objects in
plain view to be justified the basis upon which they might be
seized had to be "immediately apparent," and the requirement that the initial intrusion be lawful, both of which re-
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quirements we hold were satisfied here, the Coolidge plurality also stated that the police must discover incriminating
evidence "inadvertently," which is to say, they may not
"know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it," relying on the plain view doctrine only as a
pretense. Id., at 470. Whatever may be the final disposition of the "inadvertence" element of "plain view," 7 it
clearly was no bar to the seizure here. As in the related case
of warrantless searches based on an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the circumstances of
this meeting between Maples and Brown give no suggestion
that the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of narcotics violation might be uncovered in "plain view" in the course
of a check for driver's licenses. Here, although the officers
no doubt had an expectation that some of the cars they halted
on East Allen Street-which was part of a "medium" area of
narcotics traffic, J . App., at 33-would contain narcotics or
paraphernalia, there is no indication in the record that they
had anything beyond this generalized expectation. Likewise, there is no indication that Maples had any reason to believe that any particular object would be in Brown's glove
compartment or elsewhere in his automobile. The "inadvertence" requirement of "plain view," properly understood,
was no bar to the seizure here.
Maples lawfully viewed the green balloon in the interior of
Brown's car, and had probable cause to believe that it was
subject to seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is accordingly
reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
7
See State v. King, 191 N. W. 2d 650, 655 (Iowa 1971); United States v.
Santana, 485 F . 2d 365, 369-370 (CA 2 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 931
(1974); United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F . 2d 1097, 1101, n. t{CA 4 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U. S. 895 (1974); North v. Superior Court, 502 P. 2d 1305,
1308 (Calif. 1972).
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
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"plain view" search and seizure.
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A police officer without a war-

rant may seize evidence in plain view when (i) the officer's initial
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discovery of the evidence
(iii)

it

is
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is

at 465-466;

inadvertent,

"immediately apparent"

evidence before him, id., at 466.

to

(ii)
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the officer's

at 469-471;
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that he has

More recently, we explained in

dicta that the "immediately apparent" requirement means that the
officer must have "probable cause to associate the property [to
be seized] with criminal activity."
573,
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(1980).
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concedes that the discovery of the tied-off

balloon was inadvertent.

Ace~~~~ ,
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1 The initial intrusion may be lawful for any of several reasons.
It may be supported by a warrant unrelated to the seizure
at issue.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443, 465 (1971)
(plurality opinion) •
It may fall with in one of the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Id., at 465-466.
Or it
may be justified because the officer has-nsome other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused." Id., at 466.
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loons similar to the one at issue here.
told him of such cases.
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Even if it were not generally known that

a balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics, 3
we have recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely on his
training

and experience

to draw inferences and make deductions

that might well elude an untrained person.
tez, 449
~

ee
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411, 418

United States v. Cor~ ~1-aJ..-..,.<•f. ~

(1981).

Moreover, tbQre

aees~et

seem to

any innocent item that is commonly carried in an uninflated,

tied-off balloon such as the one Officer Maples seized.
All of the requirements for a plain view search and seizure having been satisfied here, I agree that the decision below
must be reversed.

2 I do not accept respondent's argument that the decision
below was based on state law, and thus is not reviewable here.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied directly on Coolidge,
supra, and on several state cases, each of which relied, either
directly or indirectly, on Coolidge. Neither the decision below
nor the cases it cites indicates any reliance on relevant state
law grounds.
3The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, despite its decision
here, recognized this common use of balloons in DeLao v. State,
5 50 S . W. 2 d 2 8 9 , 2 91 ( 19 7 7 ) .
Cf . i d . , at 2 9 2 ( Doug 1 as , J • , d i ssenting) ("[I] t is common knowledge that users and sellers of
narcotics carry the substance on their person in rubber balloons,
often called fingerstalls.").
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
In Coolidge v.
plurality

of

this

Court

New Hampshire,
recognized

"plain view" search and seizure.

u.s.

403

three

443

(1971),

requirements

for

a
a

A police officer without a war-

rant may seize evidence in plain view when (i) the officer's initial

intrusion is lawful, 1 id.,

at 465-466;

discovery of the evidence is inadvertent,
(iii)

it

is

"immediately apparent"

evidence before him, id., at 466.

to

(ii)

id.,

the officer's

at 469-471;

the officer

and

that he has

More recently, we explained in

dicta that the "immediately apparent" requirement means that the
officer must have "probable cause to associate the property [to
be seized] with criminal activity."
573,

587

(1980).

Cf.

Colorado v.

Payton v. New York, 445
Bannister, 449 U.S.

1

u.s.

(1980)

(per curiam) .
The plain view requirements of Coolidge are satisfactorily met in this case. 2

Respondent does not dispute that Offi-

1 The initial intrusion may be lawful for any of several reasons.
It may be supported by a warrant unrelated to the seizure
at issue. Coolidge, 403 U.S., at 465. It may fall within one of
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Id., at
465-466.
Or it may be justified because the officer haS"some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the accused." Id., at 466.
2 I do not accept respondent's argument that the decision below was based on state law, and thus is not reviewable here. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied directly on Coolidge,
supra, and on several state cases, each of which relied, either
directly or indirectly, on Coolidge. Neither the decision below
nor the cases it cites indicate any reliance on relevant state
Footnote continued on next page.
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lawful.

Respondent concedes

that the discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent.
probable cause must be shown,

as

the Payton dicta suggests,

think it is clear that it existed here.

If
I

Officer Maples testified

that he previously had made an arrest in a case where narcotics
were carried
here.

in

tied-off balloons similar

to

the one at

Other officers had told him of such cases.

issue

Even if it

were not generally known that a balloon is a common container for
carrying

illegal narcotics, 3 we have recognized that a

law en-

forcernent officer may rely on his training and experience to draw
inferences and make deductions that might well elude an untrained
person.
Moreover,

United

States

v.

Cortez,

449

u.s.

411,

418

(1981).

we are are not advised of any innocent i tern that

commonly carried in an uninflated,

is

tied-off balloon such as the

one Officer Maples seized.
All of the requirements for a plain view search and seizure having been satisfied here, I agree that the decision below
must be reversed.

law grounds.
3 The Texas Court of Cr irninal Appeals, despite its decision
here, recognized this common use of balloons in DeLao v. State,
550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (1977).
Cf. id., at 292 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[I] t is common knowledge that users and sellers of
narcotics carry the substance on their person in rubber balloons,
often called fingerstalls.") •
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur

in the

]o copie5

judgment, and also agree with much of the

Court's opinion relating to the application in this case of the
plain view exception to the Warrant Clause.

But I do not join

the Court's opinion because it goes well beyond the application
of the plain view exception.

As I read the opinion, it appears

to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment than is justified by the language and purpose of that
Amendment.

In dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339

u.s.

56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote eloquently:
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the
text and context and historic content of the Fourth
Amendment. • . .
When
[that]
Amendment
outlawed
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the
very restricted authority that even a search warrant
issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said
with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a
search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes
it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute nee e s s i ty . " I d . , at 7 0 •
To be sure,

the opinions of

this Court in Warrant Clause

cases have not always been consistent.
agreement among Justices as

They have reflected dis-

to the extent to which the Clause

defines the reasonableness standard of the Amendment.
my earliest opinions,
Court, 407

u.s.

United States v.

In one of

United States District

297 (1972), I cited Justice Frankfurter's Rabino-

witz dissent in emphasizing the importance of the Warrant Clause.
Id.,

at 316.

Although I

would not say that exceptions can be

justified only by "absolute necessity," 1 I stated that they were

1 I have considered the automobile exception, for example, as
one clearly justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See,
Footnote continued on next page.
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"few in number and carefully delineated."
continued to be my view,
Sanders,

442 u.s. 753, 759

peated by this Court.
798,

as expressed

(1982);

(1979).

Id. , at 318.
recently

This has

in Arkansas v.

It is a view frequently re-

See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.

Mincey

v.

(unanimous decision); Vale v.

Arizona,

437

Lousiana,

U.S.

385,

399 U.S.

390

30, 34

(1978)
(1970);

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 u.s. 523, 528-5/.9 (1967); Jones v. United States,
357 u.s. 493, 499 (1958).
This case involves an application of the plain view exception,

first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion in

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).

The Court today

states that this opinion "has never been expressly adopted by a
majority of this Court."

Ante, at 6.

Whatever my view may have

been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late date
to imply criticism of its articulation of this exception.
been accepted generally for over a decade. 2

Moreover,

It has
it seems

e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 u.s. 753, 760-761 (1979); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561-562 (1976); AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J.,
concurring).
2 see, e.g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F.2d 1353, 13561357 (CA9 1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F.2d 554, 558-560
(CAl 1982); United States v. Tolerton, 669 F.2d 652, 653-655
( CA 10 ) , c e r t. denied,
U.S •
( 19 8 2 ) ; On i ted States v •
Antill, 615 F.2d 648, 6~(CA5)
curiam), cert. den1ed, 449
u.s. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F.2d 1309, 13131314 (CAS 1978); United States v. Williams, 523 F.2d 64, 66-67
(CAB 1975), cert. denied, 423 u.s. 1090 (1976); United States v.
Truitt, 521 F.2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v.
Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 u.s.
983 (1973); United States v. Drew, 451 F.2d 230, 232-234 (CAS
Footnote continued on next page.
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unnecessary to cast doubt on Coolidge in this case.

Its plurali-

ty formulation is dispositive of the question before us.
Respondent

does

not

intrusion was lawful.

dispute

that Officer

Maples'

initial

Respondent also concedes that the discov-

ery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was observed

in the course of a

area of the automobile.

lawful

inspect ion of the front seat

If probable cause must be shown, as the

Payton dicta suggests, 3 I think it is clear that it existed here.
Officer Maples testified that he previously had made an arrest in
a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off balloons similar
to the one at issue here.
cases.

Other officers had told him of such

Even if it were not generally known that a balloon is a

common container for carrying illegal narcotics, we have recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely on his training and
experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might well
elude an

untrained person.

411, 418 {1981).

United States v.

Cortez,

449

u.s.

We are not advised of any innocent item that is

commonly carried in uninflated, tied-off balloon such as the one
Officer Maples seized.
Accordingly, I join the Court's judgment as it is consistent
with princples established by our prior decisions.

1971).
3 see Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 573, 587 {1980).
Although
probable cause was present in this case, I note with approval
that the Court recognizes--without deciding--that reasonable suspicion of illegal activity may be sufficient to justify a seizure
in some cases. See ante, at 7, n. 4, and 11, n. 7.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the
Court's opinion relating to the application in this case of the
plain view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do not
join the Court's opinion because it goes well beyond the application o
exception. As I read the opinion, it
appears to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of
the Fourth Amendment than is justified by the language and
purpose of that Amendment. In dissent in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote
eloquently:
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the
text and context and historic content of the Fourth
Amendment. . . . When [that] Amendment outlawed
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the
very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all
the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unrea- __
sonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only
ceptions justified by absolute necessity." I d., at 7~ ]
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To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause
cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected
disagreement among Justices as to the extent to which the
Clause defines the reasonableness standard of the Amend-

s

81-419--CONCUR
2

TEXAS v. BROWN

ment. In one of my earliest opinions, United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972), I cited
Justice Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dissent in emphasizing the
importance of theWarrant Clause. I d., at 316. Although I
would not say that exceptions can be justified only by "absolute necessity," 1 I stated that they were "few in number and
carefully delineated." Id., at 318. This has continued to be
my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U. S. 753, 759 (1979). It is a view frequently repeated by
this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798,
- - (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978)
(unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 U. S. 30, 34
(1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 52~29 (1967);
Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958).
This case involves an application of the plain view exception, first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The
Court today states that this opinion "has never been exressly adopted by a majority of this Court." Ante, at 6.
----~Wh
!==:"'atever my view~ have been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late date to imply criticism of its
articulation of this exception. It has been accepted generally for over a decade. 2 Moreover, it seems unnecessary to
1
I have considered the automobile exception, for example, as one clearly
justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, e. g., Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 760-761 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U. S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring).
2
See, e. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1353, 1356-1357 (CA9
1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F. 2d 554, 558-560 (CA11982); United
States v. Tolerton, 669 F . 2d 652, 653-655 (CAlO), cert. denied,- U. S.
(1982); United States v. Antill, 615 F . 2d 648, 649 (CA5) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F. 2d
1309, 1313-1314 (CA5 1978); United States v. Williams, 523 F. 2d 64, 66-67
(CA8 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Truitt,
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cast doubt on Coolidge in this case. Its plurality formulation
is dispositive of the question before us.
Respondent does not dispute that Officer Maples' initial intrusion was lawful. Respondent also concedes that the discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was
observed in the course of a lawful inspection of the front seat
area of the automobile. If probable cause must be shown, as
the Payton dicta suggests, 3 I think it is clear that it existed
here. Officer Maples testified that he previously had made
an arrest in a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off
balloons similar to the one at issue here. Other officers had
told him of such cases. Even if it were not generally known
that a balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics, we have recognized that a law enforcement officer
may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences
and make deductions that might well elude an untrained person. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981).
We are not advised of any innocent item that is commonly
carried in uninflated, tied-off balloon such as the one Officer
Maples seized.
- - -.;.A;.:c::.::c.:::
or:,.::d:.::ingly, I · the Court's judgment as it is consistent
with prin les estab shed by our prior decisions.

=

521 F . 2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F . 2d
67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 983 (1973); United States v.
Drew, 451 F. 2d 230, 232-234 (CA5 1971).
3
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). Although probable cause was present in this case, I note with approval that the Court recognizes-without deciding-that reasonable suspicion of illegal activity
may be sufficient to justify a seizure in some cases. See ante, at 7, n. 4,
and 11, n. 7.

3 JUSTICE STEVENS, in his dissent, addresses the legality of the
State's search of
post,

at 5-6.

the

balloon as well as of its seizure.

See

As Brown's counsel stated at oral argument that

his client "did not object to the opening of the balloon", Tr. of
Oral Arg. 47, I think it unnecessarv to reach the search question
although I am inclined to agree with the implicit concession
of counsel that if the seizure was lawful there was little or no
remaining expectation of privacy in the balloon.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
In Coolidge v.
plurality

of

this

New Hampshire,

Court

recognized

"plain view" search and seizure.

~4~ .
u.s.

403

three

443

{1971),

requirements

for

a
a

A police officer without a war-

rant may seize evidence in plain view when {i) the officer's initial

intrusion is lawful, 1

id.,

at 465-466;

discovery of the evidence is inadvertent,
{iii)

it

is

"immediately apparent"

evidence before him, id., at 466.

{ii)

id.,

the officer's

at 469-471;

to the officer

and

that he has

More recently, we explained in

dicta that the "immediately apparent" requirement means that the
officer must have "probable cause to associate the property [to
be seized] with criminal activity."
573,

587

{1980).

Cf.

Colorado v.

Payton v. New York, 445
Bannister,

449 U.S.

1

u.s.

{1980)

{per curiam) •
The plain view requirements of Coolidge are satisfactorily met in this case. 2
cer

Maples'

initial

Respondent does not dispute that Offi-

intrusion was

lawful.

Respondent concedes

1 The initial intrusion may be lawful for any of several reasons.
It may be supported by a warrant unrelated to the seizure
at issue.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 {1971)
{plurality opinion).
It may fall within one of the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Id., at 465-466.
Or it
may be justified because the officer has-nsome other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused." Id., at 466.
2 I do not accept respondent's argument that the decision
below was based on state law, and thus is not reviewable here.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied directly on Coolidge,
supra, and on several state cases, each of which relied, either
directly or indirectly, on Coolidge. Neither the decision below
nor the cases it cites indicates any reliance on relevant state
law grounds.
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that the discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent.
probable cause must be

shown,

as

the Payton dicta suggests,

think it is clear that it existed here.

If
I

Officer Maples testified

that he previously had made an arrest in a case where narcotics
were carried
here.

in tied-off balloons

Other officers had

similar

to

the one at

told him of such cases.

issue

Even if it

were not generally known that a balloon is a common container for
carrying

illegal narcotics, 3 we have recognized that a

law en-

forcement officer may rely on his training and experience to draw
inferences and make deductions that might well elude an untrained
person.
Moreover,

United

States

v.

Cortez,

449

u.s.

411,

418

(1981).

we are are not advised of any innocent i tern that

commonly carried in an uninflated,

is

tied-off balloon such as the

one Officer Maples seized.
All of the requirements for a plain view search and seizure having been satisfied here, I agree that the decision below
must be reversed.

3The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, despite its decision
here, recognized this common use of balloons in DeLao v. State,
550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (1977).
Cf. id., at 292 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[I] t is common knowleage that users and sellers of
narcotics carry the substance on their person in rubber balloons,
often called fingerstalls.").
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APPEALS OF TEXAS
[February -

, 1983]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Clifford James Brown was convicted in the
District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, for possession of
heroin in violation of state law. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that evidence introduced at his trial should have been suppressed because it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 1 That c~ur rejected the state's con-

~J

, Brown argues that the
rested on an independent and adequate state ground, and therefore that this Court lacks jurisdiction. Fox
Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). The position is untenable. The opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rests squarely on
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Con~ ;_,uf!.-.-1~~........._..,. . . - stitution in -Goolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), and on
1 l[d,~~~:1.,.,~'-#~~~~~~·~erpreting that decision, e. g., Howard v. State, 599 S. W. 2d
2---2597 (Tex. r. App. 1979); DeLao v. State, 550 S. W. 2d 289 (Tex. Cr. App.
__ g
1977); Duncan v. State, 549 S. W. 2d 730 (Tex. Cr. App. 1977); and N ichoQ
las v. State, 502 S. W. 2d 169 (Tex. Cr. App. 1973). The only mention of
k
the Texas Constitution occurs in a summary of Brown's contentions at the
/J . ~ . ~f-A->
outset of the lower court's opinion. In a field like the Fourth Amendment,
~"'i
where the federal courts have been so active in imposing standards on state
J7~ ~
and local activities, a more affirmative indication in the opinion of the state
, ,I ~~
court of reliance on state law is necessary before we will reject the likely
~=~~--~~/A
explanation that "the [state] court felt compelled by what it understood to
~ ~- •
~
be federal constitutional considerations" to reach the result it did. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. , 433 U. S. 562, 568 (1977).
Brown relies principally on Howard v. State, supra, and Duncan v.

-

?
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tention that the so-called "plain view" doctrine justified the
police seizure. Because of apparent uncertainty concerning
the scope and applicability of this doctrine, we granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - , and now reverse the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals.
On a summer evening in June, 1979, Harold Maples, an officer of the Fort Worth police force, assisted in setting up a
routine driver's license checkpoint on East Allen Street in
that city. Shortly before midnight Maples stopped an automobile driven by respondent Brown, who was alone. Standing alongside the driver's window of Brown's car, Maples
asked him for his driver's license. At roughly the same
time, Maples shined his flashlight into the car and saw Brown
withdraw his right hand from his right pants pocket.
Caught between the two middle fingers of the hand was an
opaque, green party balloon, knotted about one half inch
from the tip. Brown let the balloon fall to the seat beside his
leg, and then reached across the passenger seat and opened
the glove compartment.
Because of his previous experience in arrests for drug offenses, Maples testified that he was aware that narcotics freState, supra. Neither decision supports the proposition that the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals based its decision upon state law. In Howard,
the State argued that the plain view doctrine justified the seizure of a
closed translucent medicine jar from an automobile. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the claim, relying on Coolidge v. N ew Hampshire,
supra, and stating that the State's arguments "cannot be squared with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the plain view doctrine." 599 S. W. 2d,
at 602. The court also relied on Thomas v. State, supra, which it characterized as "[f]ollowing the teachings of Coolidge v. New Hampshire."
Ibid . An additional opinion of the court on the State's Motion for Rehearing merely elaborated upon the application of the plain view doctrine set
forth in the court's original opinion. Similarly, in Duncan, the Court of
Criminal Appeals rejected the State's reliance on the plain view theory, citing to Coolidge for a statement of the applicable law, as well as to Nicholas
v. State, 502 S. W. 2d 169 (Tex. Cr. App. 1973). Like the court's other
decisions in the area, Nicholas relied only on Coolidge.
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quently were packaged in balloons like the one in Brown's
hand. When he saw the balloon, Maples shifted his position
in order to obtain a better view of the interior of the glove
compartment. He noticed that it contained several small
plastic vials, quantities of loose white powder, and an open
bag of party balloons. After rummaging briefly through the
glove compartment, Brown told Maples that he had no driver's license in his possession. Maples then instructed him to
get out of the car and stand at its rear. Brown complied,
and, before following him to the rear of the car, Maples
reached into the car and picked up the green balloon; there
seemed to be a sort of powdery substance within the tied-off
portion of the balloon.
Maples then displayed the balloon to a fellow officer who
indicated that he "understood the situation." The two officers then advised Brown that he was under arrest. 2 They
2
1t is not clear on the record before us when Brown was arrested. The
Court of Criminal Appeals stated, at one point in its opinion, that it did not
question "the propriety of the arrest since appellant failed to produce a
driver's license." This statement might be read to suggest that Brown
was arrested upon his failure to produce a license, instead of at some point
following seizure of the balloon from the car. The transcript of the suppression hearing, however, indicates rather clearly that Brown was not
formally arrested until after seizure of the balloon. J . App. 28-31. In the
face of such indications, we decline to interpret the above-quoted clause
from the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion as evidencing a belief that an
arrest occurred prior to seizure of the balloon. Rather, we think it likely
that the court was simply reasoning that Brown's arrest, whenever it may
have taken place, was justified because of his failure to produce a driver's
license.
We do not address the argument that seizure of the balloon would have
been justified under New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1982), which permits warrantless searches of the passenger compartment of an automobile
incident to an arrest, because of the absence of clear factual findings regarding the time at which, and the reason for which, Brown was arrested
and because the lower court was not able to consider that decision. Likewise, we do not rest our decision on United States v. Ross,-- U. S. - (1982).
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also conducted an on-the-scene inventory of Brown's car,
discovering several plastic bags containing a green leafy substance and a large bottle of milk sugar. These items, like the
balloon, were seized by the officers. At the suppression
hearing conducted by the District Court, a police department
chemist testified that he had examined the substance in the
balloon seized by Maples and determined that it was heroin.
He also testified that narcotics frequently were packaged in
ordinary party balloons.
The Court of Criminal Appeals, discussing the Fourth
Amendment issue, observed that "plain view alone is never
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." Pet.
A-10, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
468 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, Douglas, BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ.) It further concluded that "Officer Maples had to
know that 'incriminatory evidence was before him when he
seized the balloon."' Pet. A-ll (emphasis supplied), quoting
DeLao v. State, 550 S. W. 2d 289, 291 (Tex. Cr. App. 1977).
On the state's petition for rehearing, three judges dissented,
stating their view that "[t]he issue turns on whether an officer, relying on years of practical experience and knowledge
commonly accepted, has probable cause to seize the balloon in
plain view." Pet. A-15, 16.
Because the "pl~ doctrine generally is invoked in
con·unction with other Fourth Amendment principles, such
as those re ating to warran s, pro a e cause, and search incident to arrest, we rehearse briefly these better understood
princi les of Fourth Amendment law.
a amen ment secures tlie rsons, houses, papers and effects of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and requires the
n ... vlexistence of probable cause before a warrant shall issue.
~
( Our cases hold that procedure by way of a warrant !.§...]ref~ed, althou h in a wide ran e of diverse situations we have
~~ · _0
reco · e
·b c
on-sense exceptiOns to this requirement. See, e. g., Warden v. ayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967)
~~~ (hot pursuit); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52

w-L -· r

tY1

r
~
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--- ---- - -----------
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(1951) (exigent circumstances); United States v. Ross, - U. S. - - (1982) (rurtomobile search); Chimel v. California,
395 U. S. 752 (1969); United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S.
218 (1973); and New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1982)
(search of person and surrounding areaCfncident to arrest);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973)
(search att.(order or "functional equivalent"); Zap v. United
States, 328 U. S. 624, 630 (1946) (consent). We have also
held to be permissible intrusions less severe than full-scale
searches or seizures without the necessity of a warrant.
See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, supra, _t§top and frisk); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, (seizure for questioning);
Delaware v. Prouse, supra, "(roadblock). One frequently
mentioned "exception to the warrant requirement," Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at 443, is the so-called
"plain view" doctrine, relied upon by the state in this case.
While conceding that the green balloon seized by Officer
Maples was clearly visible to him, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the state might not avail itself of the "plain
view" doctrine. That court said:
"For the plain view doctrine to apply, not only must
the officer be legitimately in a position to view the object, but it must be immediately apparent to the police
that they have evidence before them. This 'immediately apparent' aspect is central to the plain view exception and is here relied upon by appellant. (Citation omitted). In this case then, Officer Maples had to know that
'incriminatory evidence was before him when he seized
the balloon."' Petn. A-10, A-11.
The Court of Criminal Appeals based its conclusion primarily
on the plurality opinion of this Court in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, supra. In the Coolidge plurality's view, the
"plain view" doctrine permits the warrantless seizure by po-

- ---

-------
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lice of pr~possessions where three requirements are satisfied. 3 ~ the police officer must laWfully make an "initial intrusion" or otherwise properly be in a position from
which he can view a particular area. I d., at 465-468. t?efpWthe officer must discover incriminating evidence "inadvertently," which is to say, he may not "know in advance the
location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it," relying
on the plain view doctrine only as a pretext. ld., at 470.
~ it must be "iJ?mediately a~arent" to the police that
~~s they observe may fie ev1 ence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. ld., at 469-470.
While the lower courts generally have applied the Coolidge
plurality's discussion of "plain view," it has never
pressly adopted by a majority of this Court-:- On the contrary, t e p urah y s formula 1on was sharply criticized at the
time, see, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at
506 (Black, J., dissenting); id., at 51~521 (WHITE, J., dissenting). While not a binding precedent, as the considered
opinion of four Members of this Court it should obviQuslx be
the point of refere!!_ce J or further disc~sion of the issue.
The Cooliag;-plurality observed, lrJ:f 1s Important to keep
in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence
seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure," simply as "the normal concomitant of any
search, legal or illegal." 403 U. S., at 465. The question
whether property in plain view of the police may be seized
therefore must turn on the legality of the intrusion that en-

oeenex-

3
The plurality also remarked that "plain view alone is never enough to
justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
supra, 403 U. S., at 468. The court below appeared to understand this
phrase to impose an independent limitation upon the scope of the plain view
doctrine articulated in Coolidge. The context in which the plurality used
the phrase, however, indicates that it was merely a rephrasing of its conclusion, discussed below, that in order for the plain view doctrine to apply,
a police officer must be engaged in a lawful intrusion or must otherwise
legitimately occupy the position affording him a "plain view."
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abies them to perceive and physically seize the property in
question. The Coolidge plurality, while following this view
of the "plain view" doctrine;characterized the doctrine as an
exception to the warrant requirement. We think this may
be somewhat inaccurate.
at characterization, for example, describes application of the doctrine to seizures of property found in public areas very poorly. If police encountered
contraband or evidence of a crime concealed in a 2ublic park
few would suggest that the warrant clause had any applicability at all, and reliance upon some "exception" would be
completely unnecessary.
"Plain view" can probably be better understood simply as
an aPPlication of the reasonableness re uir ment of the
Fourt
men men to seizures o property. It is grounded
on the recognition that when a_police o:@cer has observed an
ob~ect in "plain v~w," the_owner's remaining interests rn the
ob ect are mere those of possession and ownership, see
Coolidge v. New Hampshtre, supra, 0 U. ., at 515
(WHITE, J., dissenting). Likewise, it reflects the fact that
requiring police to obtain a warrant once they have obtained
a first-hand perception of contraband, stolen property or incriminating evidence generally would be a "needless inconvenience," 403 U. 8., at 468, that might involve danger to the
police and public. Ibid. We have said previously that "the
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is
judged by balancing its intrusion on ... Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U. 8., at 654. In
light of the private and governmental interests just outlined,
our decisions have come to reflect the rule that if, while lawfull;y engaged in an activ_i!;y}il a particular ,PlaCe, po~ffi
cers perceive a SliSpic'iOus ob- ct, tl'i~y may seize it immediately.
ee arron v. United States, 275 U. 8. 192 (1927);
GO-Hart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. 8. 344, 358
(1931); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. 8. 452, 465 (1932);
Harris v. United States, 390 U. 8. 234, 236 (1968); Frazier v.

-9~

L..vL~

~-/J__

~ .1
~~

~9~r-

~
~~
~
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Cupp, 394 U. S. 731 (1969).

This rule merely reflects an
application of the Fourth Amendment's c ntral requiremen
of reasonableness to the law governing seiZures o rope y.
Applying these principles, we conclude that Officer Maples
properly seized the green balloon from Brown's automobile.
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that it did not "question ... the validity of the officer's initial stop of appellant's
vehicle as a part of a license check," Pet. A-10, and we agree.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979). It is
likewise beyond dispute that Maples' action in shining his
flashlight to illuminate the interior of Brown's car trenched
upon no right secured to the latter by the Fourth Amendment. The Court said in United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559,
563 (1927), that "[The] use of a searchlight is comparable to
the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited
by the Constitution." Numerous other courts have agreed
that the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area
simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no
Fourth Amendment protection. 4
Likewise, the fact that Maples "changed [his] position" and
"bent down at an angle so [he] could see what was inside"
Brown's car, J. App., at 16, is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. The general public could peer into the interior of Brown's automobile from any number of angles; there
'E . g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1352, 1356-1357, n. 2 (CA9
1982); United States v. Ocampo, 650 F. 2d 421, 427 (CA2 1981); United
States v. Pugh, 566 F. 2d 626, 627, n. 2 (CA81977), cert. denied, 435 U. S.
1010 (1978); United States v. Coplen, 541 F. 2d 211 (CA9 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1073 (1977); United States v. Lara, 517 F. 2d 209 (CA5
1975); United States v. Johnson, 506 F . 2d 674 (CA8 1974), cert. denied,
421 U. S. 917 (1975); United States v. Booker, 461 F. 2d 990, 992 (CA6
1972); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F. 2d 649 (CA7 1971); People v.
Waits, 580 P. 2d 391 (Colo. 1978); Redd v. State, 243 S. E. 2d 16 (Ga. 1978);
State v. Chattley, 390 A. 2d 472 (Me. 1978); State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N. W.
2d 756 (Minn. 1980); Dick v. State, 596 P. 2d 1265 (Okla. Cr. 1979); State v.
Miller, 608 P. 2d 595 (Ore. 1980); Alba v. State, 379 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1980).
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is no reason Maples should be precluded from observing as an
officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private citizen. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy, Katz v.
United States, supra, 389 U. S., at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 739-745
(1979), shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile
which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers. In short, the
conduct that enabled Maples to observe the interior of
Brown's car and of his open glove compartment was not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus there can be no dispute here as to the presence of the
first of the three requirements""'heid necessary ) Y the Coolidge plurahTy'"1ornv5Ketlie "plain View" doctrine. 5 But the
Court of Criminal Appeals, as we have notea, felt the state's
case ran aground on the requirement that the incriminating
nature of the items be "immediately apparent" to the police
officer. To the Court of Appeals, this apparently meant that
the officer must be possessed of near certainty as to the
seizable nature of the items. Decisions by this Court since
Coolidge indicate that the use of the phrase "immediately apparent" was very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it
can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty
as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary for
an application of the "plain view" doctrine.
In Colorado v. Bannister, supra, 449 U. S., at 3-4, we applied what was in substance the plain view doctrine to an offiWhile seizure of the balloon required a warrantless, physical intrusion
into Brown's automobile, this was proper, assuming that the remaining requirements of the plain view doctrine were satisfied. The "Fourth
Amendment protects people not places." Katz v. United States, supra,
389 U. S., at 351. Officer Maples' action was a limited intrusion, see Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), directed only to retrieving an object
in plain view and not offering the officer an opportunity to engage in the
type of "general exploratory search" condemned in Coolidge. As such, it
was entirely reasonable.
6
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cer's seizure of evidence from an automobile. Id., at n. 4.
The officer noticed that the occupants of the automobile
matched a description of persons suspected of a theft and that
auto parts in the open glove compartment of the car similarly
resembled ones reported stolen. The Court held that these
facts supplied the officer with "probable cause," id., at 4, and
therefore, that he could seize the incriminating items from
the car without a warrant. Plainly, the Court did not view
the "immediately apparent" language of Coolidge as establishing any requirement that a police officer "know" that certain items are contraband or evidence of a crime. Indeed,
Colorado v. Bannister, supra, was merely an application of
the rule, set forth in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573
(1980), that "[t]he ~izure of property in plain view involves
no invasion of privacy ana tS presumphvely reasonable, .Q!suming tha!.._ there is l!.robable cause to associate the property
with crtmmal actw ity." Id., at 587 (emphasis added). We
thillk this statement of the rule from Payton, supra, requiring probable cause for seizure in the ordinary case, 6 is consistent with the Fourth Amendment and § reaffirm TI:, here)
As the Court frequently has remarked, ,erobable cause is a
flexible common-sense standard. It merely requires that
the facts availa
o eo cer would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief," Carrofi v. United States, 267
U. S. 132, 162 (1925), that certain items may be contraband
or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not
demand any showing that su~ a belief b_e corr~ct Q!..!!lOre
likely true than false. A "practical, nontec'hnical" probability that incr iminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176
(1949). Moreover, our observation in United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981), regarding "particularized
6
We need not address whether, in some circumstances, a degree of suspicion lower than probable cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure in
certain cases.

f

t
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suspicion," is equally applicable to the probable cause
requirement:
"The process does not deal with hard certainties, but
with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities
was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior;
jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same-and
so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence
thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement."
With these considerations in mind it is plain that Officer
Maples possessed probable cause to believe that the balloon
in Brown's hand coiitalned an illicit substance. Maples testified that he was aware, both from his participation in previous narcotics arrests and from discussions with other officers,
that balloons tied in the manner of the one possessed by
Brown were frequently used to carry narcotics. This testimony was corroborated by that of a police department chemist who noted that it was "common" for balloons to be used in
packaging narcotics. In addition, Maples was able to observe the contents of the glove compartment of Brown's car,
which revealed further suggestions that Brown was engaged
in activities that might involve possession of illicit substances. The fact that Maples could not see through the
opaque fabric of the balloon is all but irrelevant: the distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contents-particularly to the trained eye of the officer.
In addition to its statement that for seizure of objects in
plain view to be justified the basis upon which they might be
seized had to be "immediately apparent," and the requirement that the initial intrusion be lawful, both of which requirements we hold were satisfied here, the Coolidge plurality also stated that the police must discover incriminating
evidence "inadvertently," which is to say, they may not

--------
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"know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it," relying on the plain view doctrine only as a
pretense. Id., at 470. Whatever may be the final disposition of the "inadvertence" element of "plain view," 7 it
clearly was no bar to the seizure here. As in the related case
of warrantless searches based on an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the circumstances of
this meeting between Maples and Brown give no suggestion
that the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of narcotics violation might be uncovered in "plain view" in the course
of a check for driver's licenses. Here, although the officers
no doubt had an expectation that some of the cars they halted
on East Allen Street-which was part of a "medium" area of
narcotics traffic, J. App., at 33---would contain narcotics or
paraphernalia, there is no indication in the record that they
had anything beyond this generalized expectation. Likewise, there is no indication that Maples had any reason to believe that any particular object would be in Brown's glove
compartment or elsewhere in his automobile. The "inadvertence" requirement of "plain view," properly understood,
was no bar to the seizure here.
Maples lawfully viewed the green balloon in the interior of
Brown's car, and had probable cause to believe that it was
subject to seizure unoer the rollftnAmendment. The'"Judgment o e exas ou of nminal Appeals is accordingly
reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

'See State v. King, 191 N. W. 2d 650, 655 (Iowa 1971); United States v.
Santana, 485 F. 2d 365, 369--370 (CA2 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 931
(1974); United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F. 2d 1097, 1101, n. 3 (CA4 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U. S. 895 (1974); North v. Superior Court, 502 P. 2d 1305,
1308 (Calif. 1972).
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concurring in the judgment.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), a plurality of this Court recognized three requirements for a
"plain view" search and seizure. A police officer without a
warrant may seize evidence in plain view when (i) the officer's initial intrusion is lawful, 1 id., at 465-466; (ii) the officer's discovery of the evidence is inadvertent, id., at 469-471;
and (iii) it is "immediately apparent" to the officer that he has
evidence before him, id., at 466. More recently, we explained in dicta that the "immediately apparent" requirement
means that the officer must have "probable cause to associate
the property [to be seized] with criminal activity." Payton
v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980). Cf. Colorado v.
Bannister, 449 U. S. 1 (1980) (per curiam).
~ ~~· 2 he plain view 71uirements of Coolidge are satisfactorily
,0{7- met in this cas~espondent does not dispute that Officer
JUSTICE POWELL,

' The initial intrusion may be lawful for any of several reasons. It may
be supported by a warrant unrelated to the seizure at issue. Coolidge, 403
U. S., at 465. It may fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement. I d., at 465-466. Or it may be justified because the
officer has "some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
with a search directed against the accused." I d., at 466.
2
I do not accept respondent's argument that the decision below was
based on state law, and thus is not reviewable here. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals relied directly on Coolidge, supra, and on several state
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Maples' initial intrusion was lawful. Respondent concedes
that the discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent. If
probable cause must be shown, as the Payton dicta suggests,
I think it is clear that it existed here. Officer Maples testified that he previously had made an arrest in a case where
narcotics were carried in tied-off balloons similar to the one
at issue here. Other officers had told him of such cases.
Even if it were not generally known that a balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics, 3 we have recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely on his training
and experience to draw inferences and make deductions that
might well elude an untrained person. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). Moreover, we are are not advised of any innocent item that is commonly carried in an
un_infla~~· tied-off balloon such as the one Officer Maples
Seized.
~~/._I
~~
'" ,...,.., ~ A All of the requirements £ r a plain view search and seizure
·~ ,/
r

?

pn"~

·

··

below

cases, each of which relied, either directly or indirectly, on Coolidge. Neither the decision below nor the cases it cites indicate any reliance on relevant state law grounds.
3
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, despite its decision here, recognized this common use of balloons in DeLao v. State, 550 S. W. 2d 289, 291
(1977). Cf. id., at 292 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is common knowledge that users and sellers of narcotics carry the substance on their person
in rubber balloons, often called fingerstalls.").
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Dear Bill,
Please join me in your opinion.
I may
write a short separate concurrence explaining my
understanding of the warrant requirement and the
exceptions to it.
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Justice Rehnquist
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Dear Bill:

3~~~~

I will join your judgment, but am afraid I
join your opinion.

cannot~~

It contains a good many statements that I find
difficult to reconcile with what I have said in Fourth
Amendment cases - and indeed what the Court has said. I
mention a few of my concerns.

'-1--~

I thought we took the case because the Texas court ~
misapplied the "plain view" rule. Although Coolidge was
only a plurality decision, federal courts have been follow- ~~
ing it for a decade and I have considered it established
~ ~-- _ 1
law. As I read your opinion you accept Coolidge initially '~~
as only a "point of reference" (p. 6), state that it is not ,.9 A...-/- ~1'1
an exception to the warrant clause (p. 7), but you embrace -d -~
the dicta in Payton to the effect that the third inquiry
~-~
under the plain view exception is whether there was probable ~- ~
cause. (p. 10) As we are not bound by this dicta, I would -~
not foreclose the possibility that reasonable suspicion sat- ~
isfies the third requirement of the rule. I agree there was
,
probable cause here.
~ ~
In any event, it seems to me that your opinion ~
will create uncertainty as to the force of the rule and its
specific content.
Although you and I have been together on most
Fourth Amendment cases, we have differed as to the importance of the warrant clause. I do not think it is subordinate to the reasonableness component. In Sanders v. Arkansas, in accord with a number of our decisions (including
some of mine) , I emphasized the importance of the warrant
clause and spoke of exceptions to it as few and "carefully
drawn". In your opinion in this case you refer to a "wide
range of diverse situations" in which we have recognized
"flexible, common-sense exceptions to this requirement".

/

v

\.

~

2.

In most situations, there may be little substantive difference in our views. Yet, the language and tone of
your opinion in this case is different from what I have
written in several opinions.
Other statements that puzzle me include the first
couple of sentences in the first full paragraph on page 7.
Would an officer be entitled to take a look inside my wallet
if he happened to find it lying on my desk? On the same
page (p. 7) the opinion states that our decisions reflect
the rule that a "police officer [who] perceives a suspicious
object", may "seize it immediately". You cite several
cases, only two of which (Harris and Frazier) tend to support your position. Maron and Lefkowitz can be read to the
contrary.
In sum, while we normally try to work out language
in an opinion where there is considerable agreement, I have
no right to expect you to make the substantial changes in
language that would relieve my concerns. Accordingly, I am
circulating a concurring opinion based on the plain view
rule that says substantially all that I think is necessary
to be said on the merits of this case.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
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To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

Texas v. Brown, No. 81-419
You asked me to look at the five cases WHR cites on the

bottom of page 7 of his opinion in this case.

None of the cases

support a rule allowing seizure of any "suspicious" object, but
(Harris,

Harris and Frazier are at least relevant to this case.

in particular, may be worth adding to the next draft of our opinion.}

In brief, the five cases hold as follows:

Marron v.

,

~
~nts

United States,

27 5 u.S.

19 2

( 19 27} : Prohibi-

had a warrant to search for liquor.

While executing

~r~- this warrant, they a s~ d the ~ender and seized ledgers

_, tY'f'· relating to 1'
~~ledge as incident to search for
~1ncident to bartender's arrest.
Go-Bart Importing Co.
358

v.

HELD:

Agents could not

seize

liquor, but could seize them as

United States,

282

u.s.

344,

(1931}: Prohibition agents, acting under color of an invalid

arrest warrant, arrested two company officers and conducted general search of premises.

HELD: Search violated Fourth Amendment.

At 358, Marron was distinguished.
285

defendants
liquor orders.
for evidence.

u.s.

452,

465

(1932}:

in room used to solicit

Upon making the arrest, agents searched the room
HELD: Search violated Fourth Amendment.

Dicta at

465-466 draw a distinction between searches "merely to get evi-

dence" and searches "to find stolen goods for return to the owner,"

to take forfeited property,

and to seize the instrumental-

page 2.

i ties of crime

11

in order

to prevent

the commission of crime.

(The Court does not put it in such terms,

11

but the exclusionary

rule would only affect the former category of searches.}

Barris v.

Police arrested a

curiam}:
the

car

he

was

u.s.

United States, 390

driving.

234, 236

(1968}

(~

robbery suspect and validly seized
After

completing

a

valid

inventory

search of the car, an officer went to close the windows to protect the car from rain.

He then inadvertently saw a registration

card belonging to the robbery victim that had been caught in the
door jamb.

HELD: Card was admissible.

It was discovered in the

plain view of an officer who had the right to be where he was.
(The Court does

not discuss

probable

cause

in

this

brief

~

curiam, but it is clear that there was at least probable cause.
The victim's name was prominent on the card.}

u.s.

Frazier v. Cupp, 394
in both used a duffel bag.

731 (1969}: Petr and his cous-

While it was at the cousin's house,

he consented to a search of
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TEXAS, PETITIONER v. CLIFFORD JAMES BROWN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS OF TEXAS
[March - , 1983]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Clifford James Brown was convicted in the
District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, for possession of
heroin in violation of state law. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that evidence introduced at his trial should have been suppressed because it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 1 That court rejected the state's conBrown argues that the decision below rested on an independent and adequate state ground, and therefore that this Court lacks jurisdiction. Fox
Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). The position is untenable. The opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rests squarely on
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), and on
Texas cases interpreting that decision, e. g., Howard v. State, 599 S. W. 2d
597 (Tex. Cr. App. 1979); DeLao v. State, 550 S. W. 2d 289 (Tex. Cr. App.
1977); Duncan v. State, 549 S. W. 2d 730 (Tex. Cr. App. 1977); and Nicholas v. State, 502 S. W. 2d 169 (Tex. Cr. App. 1973). The only mention of
the Texas Constitution occurs in a summary of Brown's contentions at the
outset of the lower court's opinion. In a field like the Fourth Amendment,
where the federal courts have been so active in imposing standards on state
and local activities, a more affinnative indication in the opinion of the state
court of reliance on state law is necessary before we will reject the likely
explanation that "the [state] court felt compelled by what it understood to
be federal constitutional considerations" to reach the result it did. Z acchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 568 (1977).
Brown relies principally on Howard v. State, supra, and Duncan v.
1
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tention that the so-called "plain view'' doctrine justified the
police seizure. Because of apparent uncertainty concerning
the scope and applicability of this doctrine, we granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - , and now reverse the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals.
On a summer evening in June, 1979, Harold Maples, an officer of the Fort Worth police force, assisted in setting up a
routine driver's license checkpoint on East Allen Street in
that city. Shortly before midnight Maples stopped an automobile driven by respondent Brown, who was alone. Standing alongside the driver's window of Brown's car, Maples
asked him for his driver's license. At roughly the same
time, Maples shined his flashlight into the car and saw Brown
withdraw his right hand from his right pants pocket.
Caught between the two middle fingers of the hand was an
opaque, green party balloon, knotted about one half inch
from the tip. Brown let the balloon fall to the seat beside his
leg, and then reached across the passenger seat and opened
the glove compartment.
Because of his previous experience in arrests for drug of- ·
fenses, Maples testified that he was aware that narcotics freState, supra. Neither decision supports the proposition that the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals based its decision upon state law. In Howard,
the State argued that the plain view doctrine justified the seizure of a
closed translucent medicine jar from an automobile. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the claim, relying on Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
supra, and stating that the State's arguments "cannot be squared with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the plain view doctrine." 599 S. W. 2d,
at 602. The court also relied on Thomas v. State, supra, which it characterized as "[f]ollowing the teachings of Coolidge v. New Hampshire."
Ibid. An additional opinion of the court on the State's Motion for Rehearing merely elaborated upon the application of the plain view doctrine set
forth in the court's original opinion. Similarly, in Duncan, the Court of
Criminal Appeals rejected the State's reliance on the plain view theory, citing to Coolidge for a statement of the applicable law, as well as to Nicholas
v. State, 502 S. W. 2d 169 (Tex. Cr. App. 1973). Like the court's other
decisions in the area, Nicholas relied only on Coolidge.
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quently were packaged in balloons like the one in Brown's
hand. When he saw the balloon, Maples shifted his position
in order to obtain a better view of the interior of the glove
compartment. He noticed that it contained several small
plastic vials, quantities of loose white powder, and an open
bag of party balloons. After rummaging briefly through the
glove compartment, Brown told Maples that he had no driver's license in his possession. Maples then instructed him to
get out of the car and stand at its rear. Brown complied,
and, before following him to the rear of the car, Maples
reached into the car and picked up the green balloon; there
seemed to be a sort of powdery substance within the tied-off
portion of the balloon.
Maples then displayed the balloon to a fellow officer who
indicated that he "understood the situation." The two officers then advised Brown that he was under arrest. 2 They
also conducted an on-the-scene inventory of Brown's car,
discovering several plastic bags containing a green leafy sub2
It is not clear on the record before us when Brown was arrested. The
Court of Criminal Appeals stated, at one point in its opinion, that it did not
question "the propriety of the arrest since appellant failed to produce a
driver's license." This statement might be read to suggest that Brown
was arrested upon his failure to produce a license, instead of at some point
following seizure of the balloon from the car. The transcript of the suppression hearing, however, indicates rather clearly that Brown was not
formally arrested until after seizure of the balloon. J. App. 28-31. In the
face of such indications, we decline to interpret the above-quoted clause
from the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion as evidencing a belief that an
arrest occurred prior to seizure of the balloon. Rather, we think it likely
that the court was simply reasoning that Brown's arrest, whenever it may
have taken place, was justified because of his failure to produce a driver's
license.
We do not address the argument that seizure of the balloon would have
been justified under New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1982), which permits warrantless searches of the passenger compartment of an automobile
incident to an arrest, because of the absence of clear factual findings regarding the time at which, and the reason for which, Brown was arrested (/-?11
and because the lower court was not able to consider that decision.

I

(,~
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stance and a large bottle of milk sugar. These items, like the
balloon, were seized by the officers. At the suppression
hearing conducted by the District Court, a police department
chemist testified that he had examined the substance in the
balloon seized by Maples and determined that it was heroin.
He also testified that narcotics frequently were packaged in
ordinary party balloons.
The Court of Criminal Appeals, discussing the Fourth
Amendment issue, observed that "plain view alone is never
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." Pet.
A-10, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
468 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, Douglas, BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ.) It further concluded that "Officer Maples had to
know that 'incriminatory evidence was before him when he
seized the balloon.'" Pet. A-ll (emphasis supplied), quoting
DeLao v. State, 550 S. W. 2d 289, 291 (Tex. Cr. App. 1977).
On the state's petition for rehearing, three judges dissented,
stating their view that "[t]he issue turns on whether an officer, relying on years of practical experience and knowledge
commonly accepted, has probable cause to seize the balloon in
plain view." Pet. A-15, 16.
Because the "plain view" doctrine generally is invoked in
conjunction with other Fourth Amendment principles, such
as those relating to warrants, probable cause, and search incident to arrest, we rehearse briefly these better understood
principles of Fourth Amendment law. That amendment secures the persons, houses, papers and effects of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and requires the
existence of probable cause before a warrant shall issue.
Our cases hold that procedure by way of a warrant is pre-J
ferred, although in a wide range of diverse situations we have
ecognized flexible, common-sense exceptions to this requireent. See, e. g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967)
ot pursuit); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51-52
(1951) (exigent circumstances); United States v. Ross, - U. S. - - (1982) (automobile search); Chimel v. California,

/
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395 U. S. 752 (1969); United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S.
218 (1973); and New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1982)
(search of person and surrounding area incident to arrest);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973)
(search at border or "functional equivalent"); Zap v. United
States, 328 U. S. 624, 630 (1946) (consent). We have also
held to be permissible intrusions less severe than full-scale
searches or seizures without the necessity of a warrant.
See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, supra, (stop and frisk); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, (seizure for questioning);
Delaware v. Prouse, supra, (roadblock). One frequently
mentioned "exception to the warrant requirement," Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at 443, is the so-called
"plain view" doctrine, relied upon by the state in this case.
While conceding that the green balloon seized by Officer
Maples was clearly visible to him, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the state might not avail itself of the "plain
view" doctrine. That court said:
"For the plain view doctrine to apply, not only must
the officer be legitimately in a position to view the object, but it must be immediately apparent to the police
that they have evidence before them. This 'immediately apparent' aspect is central to the plain view exception and is here relied upon by appellant. (Citation omitted). In this case then, Officer Maples had to know that
'incriminatory evidence was before him when he seized
the balloon."' Petn. A-10, A-11.
The Court of Criminal Appeals based its conclusion primarily
on th~opinion of this Court in Coolidge v. New
Hamps tre, supra. In the Coolidge~ view, the
"plain view" doctrine permits the warr~izure by police of private possessions where three requirements are satisfied. 3 First, the police officer must lawfully make an "ini8

The~ also remarked that ''plain view alone is never enough to
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tial intrusion" or otherwise properly be in a position from
which he can view a particular area. I d., at 465--468. Second, the officer must discover incriminating evidence "inadvertently," which is to say, he may not "know in advance the
location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it," relying
on the plain view doctrine only as a pretext. ld., at 470.
Finally, it must be "immediately apparent" to the police that
the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. ld., at 469-470.
While the lower courts generally have applied the Coolidge
~discussion of "plain view," it has never been ex~dopted by a majority of this Court. On the contrary, th~s formulation was sharply criticized at the
time, see, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at
506 (Black, J., dissenting); id., at 516-521 (WHITE, J., dissenting). While not a binding precedent, as the considered
opinion of four Members of this Court it should obviously be
the point of reference for further discussion of the issue.
The Coolidge uralit observed, "It is important to keep
in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence
seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure," simply as "the normal concomitant of any
search, legal or illegal." 403 U. S., at 465. The question
whether property in plain view of the police may be seized
therefore must turn on the legality of the intrusion that enables them to perceive and
ically seize the property in
question. The Coolidg luralit while following this apjustify the warrantless seizure of evidence." Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
supra, 403 U. S., at 468. The court below appeared to understand this
phrase to impose an independent limitation upon the scope of the ain view
doctrine articulated in Coolidge. The context in which th luralit used
the phrase, however, indicates that it was merely a rephrasing of its conclusion, discussed below, that in order for the plain view doctrine to apply,
a police officer must be engaged in a lawful intrusion or must otherwise
legitimately occupy the position affording him a "plain view."
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proach to "plain view," characterized it as an independent ex,ception to the warrant requirement. At least from an analytical perspective, this description may be somewhat
inaccurate. We recognized in Payton v. New York, 445
U. S. 573, 58~87 (1980), the well-settled rule that "objects
such as weapons or contraband found in a public place may be
seized by the police without a warrant. The seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause
to associate the property with criminal activity." A different situation is presented, however, when the property in
open view is "situated on private premises to which access is
not otherwise available for the seizing officer." Id., at 587,
quoting, G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S.
338, 354 (1977). As these cases indicate, "plain view" provides grounds for seizure of an item when an officer's access
to an object has some prior justification under the Fourth
Amendment. 4 "Plain view" is perhaps better understood,
• Thus, police may perceive an object while executing a search warrant,
or they may come across an item while acting pursuant to some exception
to the warrant clause, e. g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Alternatively, police may need no justification under the Fourth Amendment for their access to an item, such as
when property is left in a public place, see Payton v. New York, supra, 445
U.S., at 587.
It is important to distinguish "plain view," as used in Coolidge to justify
seizure of an object, from an officer's mere observation of an item left in
plain view. Whereas the latter generally involves no Fourth Amendment
search, see pp.
, infra; Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347
(1967), the former generally does implicate the Amendment's limitations
upon seizures of personal property. The information obtained as a result
of observation of an object in plain sight may be the basis for probable
cause or reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. In turn, these levels of
suspicion may, in some cases, see e. g., Terry v. Ohio, supra; United States
v. Ross,-- U. S. - - (1982), justify police conduct affording them access to a particular item.
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therefore, not as an independent "exception" to the warrant
clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer's "access to an object" may be.
The principle is grounded on the recognition that when a
police officer has observed an object in "plain view," the owner's r~jute!:_ests in the object are merely those of possessiOn. ana ownership, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
supra, 403 U. S., at 515 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Likewise,
it reflects the fact that requiring police to obtain a warrant
once they have obtained a first-hand perception of contraband, stolen property or incriminating evidence generally
would be a "needless inconvenience," 403 U. S., at 468, that
might involve danger to the police and public. Ibid. We
have said previously that "the permissibility of a particular
law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion
on . . . Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
d 'P~ 11 1;\-t
legitimate governmental interests." Delaware v. Prouse,
supra, 440 U. S., at 654. In light of the private and govern] fl\1$ wvltf ~ 1
mental interests just outlined, our decisions have come to re- ~( el\hrt ~roatJ,
fleet the rule that if, while)l!.._wfully engaged in an acti~y in a -rt •> Ft~ r too
particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious object,
th~ze it immediately. See Marron v. UniteD 1heSt ca-~~s Jo 11.or
States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
~L<tpfbrt WH~
United States, 282 U. S. 344, 358 (1931); United States v.
"(l.f'rd...xr
Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 465 (1932); Harris v. United States, l
'ThL$' $~'pfJ'rt tcdfl¥.
390 U. S. 234, 236 (1968); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 73!)
ntl€ -as /-1
(1969). This rule merely reflects an application of the l
Fourth Amendment's central requirement of reasonableness ) ?
to the law governing seizures of property.
Applying these principles, we conclude that Officer Maples
properly seized the green balloon from Brown's automobile.
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that it did not "question ... the validity of the officer's initial stop of appellant's
vehicle as a part of a license check," Pet. A-10, and we agree.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979). It is
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likewise beyond dispute that Maples' action in shining his
flashlight to illuminate the interior of Brown's car trenched
upon no right secured to the latter by the Fourth Amendment. The Court said in United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559,
563 (1927), that "[The] use of a searchlight is comparable to
the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited
by the Constitution." Numerous other courts have agreed
that the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area
simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no
Fourth Amendment protection. 6
Likewise, the fact that Maples "changed [his] position" and
"bent down at an angle so [he] could see what was inside"
Brown's car, J. App., at 16, is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. The general public could peer into the interior of Brown's automobile from any number of angles; there
is no reason Maples should be precluded from observing as an
officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private citizen. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy, Katz v.
United States, supra, 389 U. S., at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 739-745
(1979), shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile
which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers. In short, the
~ E. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1352, 1356-1357, n. 2 (CA9
1982); United States v. Ocampo, 650 F. 2d 421, 427 (CA2 1981); United
States v. P'U{Jh, 566 F. 2d 626, 627, n. 2 (CA81977), cert. denied, 435 U. S.
1010 (1978); United States v. Coplen, 541 F. 2d 211 (CA9 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1073 (1977); United States v. Lara, 517 F. 2d 209 (CA5
1975); United States v. Johnson, 506 F. 2d 674 (CAS 1974), cert. denied,
421 U. S. 917 (1975); United States v. Booker, 461 F. 2d 990, 992 (CA6
1972); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F. 2d 649 (CA7 1971); People v.
Waits, 580 P. 2d 391 (Colo. 1978); Redd v. State, 243 S. E. 2d 16 (Ga. 1978);
State v. Chattley, 390 A. 2d 472 (Me. 1978); State v. Vohnoutka , 292 N. W.
2d 756 (Minn. 1980); Dick v. State, 596 P. 2d 1265 (Okla. Cr. 1979); State v.
Miller, 608 P. 2d 595 (Ore. 1980); Albo v. State, 379 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1980).
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conduct that enabled Maples to observe the interior of
Brown's car and of his open glove compartment was not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus there can be no dispute here as to the presence of the
first~f.e three requirements held necessary by the Coolidge pluralit to invoke the "plain view" doctrine. 6 But the
Cou
riminal Appeals, as we have noted, felt the state's
case ran aground on the requirement that the incriminating
nature of the items be "immediately apparent" to the police
officer. To the Court of Appeals, this apparently meant that
the officer must be possessed of near certainty as to the
seizable nature of the items. Decisions by this Court since
Coolidge indicate that the use of the phrase "immediately apparent" was very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it
can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty
as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary for
an application of the "plain view" doctrine.
In Colorado v. Bannister, supra, 449 U. S., at 3-4, we applied what was in substance the plain view doctrine to an officer's seizure of evidence from an automobile. I d., at n. 4.
The officer noticed that the occupants of the automobile
matched a description of persons suspected of a theft and that
auto parts in the open glove compartment of the car similarly
resembled ones reported stolen. The Court held that these
facts supplied the officer with "probable cause," id., at 4, and
therefore, that he could seize the incriminating items from
the car without a warrant. Plainly, the Court did not view
the "immediately apparent" language of Coolidge as establishing any requirement that a police officer "know" that certain items are contraband or evidence of a crime. Indeed,
Colorado v. Bannister, supra, was merely an application of
the rule, set forth in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573
6
While seizure of the balloon required a warrantless, physical intrusion
into Brown's automobile, this was proper, assuming that the remaining requirements of the plain view doctrine were satisfied. United States v.
Ross,- U. S. (1982).
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(1980), that "[t]he seizure of property in plain view involves
no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property
with criminal activity." /d., at 587 (emphasis added). We
think this statement of the rule from Payton, supra, requiring probable cause for seizure in the ordinary case, 7 is consistent with the Fourth Amendment and we reaffirm it here.
As the Court frequently has remarked, probable cause is a
flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that
the facts available to the officer would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief," Carroll v. Uni ed States, 267
U. S. 132, 162 (1925), that certain item may b contraband
or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not
demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more
likely true than false. A "practical, nontechnical" probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176
(1949). Moreover, our observation in United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981), regarding "particularized
suspicion," is equally applicable to the probable cause
requirement:
"The process does not deal with hard certainties, but
with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities
was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior;
jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same-and
so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence
thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement."
With these considerations in mind it is plain that Officer
Maples possessed probable cause to believe that the balloon
7
We need not address whether, in some circumstances, a degree of suspicion lower than probable cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure in
certain cases.
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in Brown's hand contained an illicit substance. Maples testified that he was aware, both from his participation in previous narcotics arrests and from discussions with other officers,
that balloons tied in the manner of the one possessed by
Brown were frequently used to carry narcotics. This testimony was corroborated by that of a police department chemist who noted that it was "common" for balloons to be used in
packaging narcotics. In addition, Maples was able to observe the contents of the glove compartment of Brown's car,
which revealed further suggestions that Brown was engaged
in activities that might involve possession of illicit substances. The fact that Maples could not see through the
opaque fabric of the balloon is all but irrelevant: the distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contents-particularly to the trained eye of the officer.
In addition to its statement that for seizure of objects in
plain view to be justified the basis upon which they might be
seized had to be "immediately apparent," and the requirement that the initial intrusion be lawful, both of which requirements we hold were satisfied here, the Coolidge plurality also stated that the police must discover incriminating
evidence "inadvertently," which is to say, they may not
"know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it," relying on the plain view doctrine only as a
pretense. !d., at 470. Whatever may be the final disposition of the "inadvertence" element of "plain view," 8 it
learly was no bar to the seizure here. The circumstances of
this meeting between Maples and Brown give no suggestion
that the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of narcotics violation might be uncovered in "plain view" in the course
See State v. King, 191 N. W. 2d 650, 655 (Iowa 1971); United States v.
Santana, 485 F. 2d 365, 369--370 (CA2 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 931
(1974); United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F. 2d 1097, 1101, n. 3 (CA4 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U. S. 895 (1974); North v. Superior Court, 502 P. 2d 1305,
1308 (Calif. 1972).
8
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of a check for driver's licenses. Here, although the officers
no doubt had an expectation that some of the cars they halted
on East Allen Street-which was part of a "medium" area of
narcotics traffic, J. App., at 33--would contain narcotics or
paraphernalia, there is no indication in the record that they
had anything beyond this generalized expectation. Likewise, there is no indication that Maples had any reason to believe that any particular object would be in Brown's glove
compartment or elsewhere in his automobile. The "inadvertence" requirement of "plain view," properly understood,
was no bar to the seizure here.
Maples lawfully viewed the green balloon in the interior of
Brown's car, and had probable cause to believe that it was
subject to seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is accordingly
reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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barring only except ions justified by absolute
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur

in the judgment, and also agree with much of the

Court's opinion relating to the application in this case of the
plain view exception to the Warrant Clause.

But I do not join

the Court's opinion because it goes well beyond the application
of the plain view exception.

As I read the opinion, it appears

to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment than is justified by the language and purpose of that
Amendment.

In dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339

u.s.

56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote eloquently:
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the
text and context and historic content of the Fourth
Amendment....
When
[that]
Amendment
outlawed
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the
very restricted authority that even a search warrant
issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said
with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a
search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes
it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity." Id., at 70.
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Katz v. United States, 389 u.s. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-529 (1967); Jones v. United States,
357 u.s. 493, 499 (1958).
This case involves an application of the plain view exception,

first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion in

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443 (1971).

The Court today

states that this opinion "has never been expressly adopted by a
majority of this Court."

Ante, at 6.

Whatever my view may have

been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late date
to imply criticism of its articulation of this exception.
been accepted generally for over a decade. 2

Moreover,

It has
it seems

e • g • , Arkansas v . Sanders, 4 4 2 U. S . 7 53 , 7 6 0 -7 61 ( 19 7 9) ; United
States v. Martinez-Puerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561-562 (1976); AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J.,
concurring) •
2 see, e.g., United States v. Chesher, 678 P.2d 1353, 13561357 (CA9 1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 P.2d 554, 558-560
(CAl 1982); United States v. Tolerton, 669 P.2d 652, 6S3-655
( CA 10) , c e r t. denied,
U.S •
( 19 8 2) ; United States v •
Antill, 615 P.2d 648, 6~(CA5)
curiam), cert. den1ed, 449
u.s. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 P.2d 1309, 13131314 (CAS 1978); Un1ted States v. Williams, 523 P.2d 64, 66-67
(CA8 1975), cert. denied, 423 u.s. 1090 (1976); United States v.
Truitt, 521 P.2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v.
Pacelli, 470 P.2d 67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
983 (1973); United States v. Drew, 451 P.2d 230, 232-234 (CAS
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unnecessary to cast doubt on Coolidge in this case.
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ty formulation is dispositive of the question before us.
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ery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was observed
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area of the automobile.
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front seat

If probable cause must be shown, as the

Payton dicta suggests, 3 I think it is clear that it existed here.
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Officer Maples testified that he previously had made an arrest in
a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off balloons similar
to the one at issue here.
cases.

Other officers had told him of such

Even if it were not generally known that a balloon is a

common container for carrying illegal narcotics, we have recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely on his training and
experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might well
elude an

untrained

411, 418 (1981).

person.
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We are not advised of any innocent item that is

commonly carried in uninflated, tied-off balloon such as the one
6 fficer Maples seized.
Accordingly, I join the Court's judgment as it is consistent
with princples established by our prior decisions.

1971).
3 see Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 573, 587 (1980).
Although
probable cause was present in this case, I note with approval
that the Court recognizes--without deciding--that reasonable suspicion of illegal activity may be sufficient to justify a seizure
in some cases. See ante, at 7, n. 4, and 11, n. 7.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the
Court's opinion relating to the application in this case of the
plain view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do not
join the Court's opinion because it goes well beyond the application of the exception. As I read the opinion, it appears
to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment than is justified by the language and
purpose of that Amendment. In dissent in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote
eloquently:
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the
text and context and historic content of the Fourth
Amendment. . . . When [that] Amendment outlawed
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the
very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all
the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only
exceptions justified by absolute necessity." Id., at 70.
To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause
cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected
disagreement among Justices as to the extent to which the
Clause defines the reasonableness standard of the Amend-
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ment. In one of my earliest opinions, United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972), I cited
Justice Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dissent in emphasizing the
importance of the Warrant Clause. I d., at 316. Although I
would not say that exceptions can be justified only by "absolute necessity," 1 I stated that they were "few in number and
carefully delineated." !d., at 318. This has continued to be
my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U. S. 753, 759 (1979). It is a view frequently repeated by
this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798,
- - (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978)
(unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 U. S. 30, 34
(1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528-529 (1967);
Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958).
This case involves an application of the plain view exception, first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The
Court today states that this opinion "has never been expressly adopted by a majority of this Court." Ante, at 6.
Whatever my view might have been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late date to imply criticism of its
articulation of this exception. It has been accepted generally for over a decade. 2 Moreover, it seems unnecessary to
1
I have considered the automobile exception, for example, as one clearly
justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, e. g., Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 760-761 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U. S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring).
• see, e. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1353, 1356-1357 (CA9
1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F. 2d 554, 558-560 (CA11982); United
States v. Tolerton, 669 F. 2d 652, 653-655 (CAlO), cert. denied,- U. S.
(1982); United States v. Antill, 615 F. 2d 648, 649 (CA5) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F. 2d
1309, 1313-1314 (CA5 1978); United States v. Williams, 523 F. 2d 64, 66-67
(CA8 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Truitt,
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cast doubt on Coolidge in this case. Its plurality formulation
is dispositive of the question before us.
Respondent does not dispute that Officer Maples' initial intrusion was lawful. Respondent also concedes that the discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was
observed in the course of a lawful inspection of the front seat
area of the automobile. If probable cause must be shown, as
the Payton dicta suggests, 3 I think it is clear that it existed
here. Officer Maples testified that he previously had made
an arrest in a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off
balloons similar to the one at issue here. Other officers had
told him of such cases. Even if it were not generally known
that a balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics, we have recognized that a law enforcement officer
may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences
and make deductions that might well elude an untrained person. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981).
We are not advised of any innocent item that is commonly
carried in uninflated, tied-off balloon such as the one Officer
Maples seized.
Accordingly, I concur in the Court's judgment as it is consistent with principles established by our prior decisions.

521 F. 2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F. 2d
67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 983 (1973); United States v.
Drew, 451 F. 2d 230, 232-234 (CA5 1971).
3
See Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980). Although probable cause was present in this case, I note with approval that the Court recognizes-without deciding-that reasonable suspicion of illegal activity
may be sufficient to justify a seizure in some cases. See ante, at 7, n. 4,
and 11, n. 7.
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"' :near Bi 11:
As \''e usually aq ree ., in the criminal law area, !
write to say why I have concluded that we are too far apart
in this case to qet together. My view of the relative importance of the warrant clause has differed from yours and
' the Chief's, and apparently now from Byron's and San~ra's.
Jn view of what I have written about it in the past, T can.. ~ot joi.n your oPinion.

Also, I am troubled by the "cold water" that you
toss on Potter's opinion in Coolidge. If we had come on the
Court earlier, I am by no means sure I would have joined
· Potter the way he wrote i.t. Rut at least the substance of
the plain view exception seems established, and r have not
been aware that it has created any genuine problem. The
rule clearly fits this case , and I would have thought that
no Purpose is served by not making a straightforward application of it here.
•
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March 24, 1983

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re: No. 81-419 - Texas v. Brown
Dear Bill:
I have delayed my vote in this case because, like Lewis,
I have been troubled about the breadth of your opinion.
I
share his feeling that the opinion "goes well beyond the
application of the exception." Thus, as of now, I am joining Lewis' opinion on the assumption that he will eliminate·
its third footnote.
Sincerely,

-1?---

Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference
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March 24, 1983

JusTtcE HARRY A. sLAcKMUN

Re:

No. 81-419, Texas v. Brown

Dear Lewis:
If, as we discussed by telephone this afternoon,
you would eliminate footnote 3 on page 3 of your opinion
concurring in the judgment, I would be glad to join your
opinion. I suggest this only because I would prefer to
meet the situation described in that footnote when it
arises.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc:
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The Conference
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins,
concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the
"'iiiiiit}opinion relating to the application in this case of the
lain view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do not
opinion because it goes well beyond the applijoin the
cation of the exception. As I read the opinion, it appears
to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment than is justified by the language and
purpose of that Amendment. In dissent in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote
eloquently:
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the
text and context and historic content of the Fourth
Amendment. . . . When [that] Amendment outlawed
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the
very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all
the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only
exceptions justified by absolute necessity." !d., at 70.
To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause
cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected
disagreement among Justices as to the extent to which the
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Clause defines the reasonableness standard of the Amendment. In one of my earliest opinions, United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972), I cited
Justice Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dissent in emphasizing the
importance of the Warrant Clause. I d., at 316. Although I
would not say that exceptions can be justified only by "absolute necessity," 1 I stated that they were "few in number and
carefully delineated." Id., at 318. This has continued to be
my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U. S. 753, 759 (1979). It is a view frequently repeated by
this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798,
-:It" (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978)
(unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 U. S. 30, 34
(1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 52~529 (1967);
Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958).
This case involves an application of the plain view exception, first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The
J--~
today states that this opinion "has never been exadopted by a majority of this Court." Ante, at 6.
Whatever my view might have been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late date to imply criticism of its
articulation of this exception. It has been accepted generally for over a decade. 2 Moreover, it seems unnecessary to
'I have considered the automobile exception, for example, as one clearly
justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, e. g., Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 760-761 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U. S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring).
2
See, e. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1353, 135&-1357 (CA9
1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F. 2d 554, 558-560 (CA11982); United
States v. Tolerton, 669 F. 2d 652, 653-655 (CAlO), cert. denied,- U. S.
(1982); United States v. Antill, 615 F. 2d 648, 649 (CA5) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F. 2d
1309, 1313-1314 (CA5 1978); United States v. Williams, 523 F. 2d 64, 6&-67
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cast doubt on Coolidge in t · ase. Its plurality formulation
is dis ositive of the question b ore us.
Responden does not dispute t at Officer Maples' initial intrusion was lawful. 2 z d$ t also concedes that the discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was
observed in the course of a lawful inspection of the front seat
area of the automobile. If probable cause must be shown, as
t e ay on 1c a sugges , see Payton v. New York, 445
U. S. 573, 587 (1980), I think it is clear that it existed here.
Officer Maples testified that he previously had made an arrest in a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off balloons
similar to the one at issue here. Other officers had told him
of such cases. Even if it were not generally known that a
balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics,
we have recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely
on his training and experience to draw inferences and make
deductions that might well elude an untrained person.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). We are
not advised of any innocent item that is commonly carried in
uninflated, tied-off balloon such as the one Officer Maples
seized.
Accordingly, I concur in the
judgment as it is consistent with principles established by our prior decisions.

(CA8 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Truitt,
521 F. 2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F. 2d
67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 983 (1973); United States v.
Drew, 451 F. 2d 230, 232-234 (CA5 1971).
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Justice White
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JusTICE PowELL, with whom JusTICE BLACKMUN joins,
concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the
Court's opinion relating to the application in this case of the
plain view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do not
join the Court's opinion because it goes well beyond the application of the exception. As I read the opinion, it appears
to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment than is justified by the language and
purpose of that Amendment. In dissent in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote
eloquently:
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the
text and context and historic content of the Fourth
Amendment. . . . When [that] Amendment outlawed
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the
very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all
the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only
exceptions justified by absolute necessity." I d., at 70.
To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause
cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected
disagreement among Justices as to the extent to which the

I
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Clause defines the reasonableness standard of the Amendment. In one of my earliest opinions, United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972), I cited
Justice Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dissent in emphasizing the
importance of the Warrant Clause. I d., at 316. Although I
would not say that exceptions can be justified only by "absolute necessity," 1 I stated that they were "few in number and
carefully delineated." Id., at 318. This has continued to be
my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U. S. 753, 759 (1979). It is a view frequently repeated by
this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798,
- - (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978)
(unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 U. S. 30, 34
(1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 52~529 (1967);
Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958).
This case involves an application of the plain view exception, first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The
Court today states that this opinion "has never been expressly adopted by a majority of this Court." Ante, at 6.
Whatever my view might have been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late date to imply criticism of its
articulation of this exception. It has been accepted generally for over a decade. 2 Moreover, it seems unnecessary to
'I have considered the automobile exception, for example, as one clearly
justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, e. g., Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 760-761 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U. S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring).
• see, e. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1353, 135&-1357 (CA9
1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F. 2d 554, 55~560 (CA11982); United
States v. Tolerton, 669 F. 2d 652, 653-655 (CAlO), cert. denied,- U. S.
(1982); United States v. Antill, 615 F. 2d 648, 649 (CA5) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F. 2d
1309, 1313-1314 (CA51978); United States v. Williams, 523 F. 2d 64, 6&-67
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cast doubt on Coolidge in this case. Its plurality formulation
is dispositive of the question before us.
Respondent does not dispute that Officer Maples' initial intrusion was lawful. Respondent also concedes that the discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was
observed in the course of a lawful inspection of the front seat
area of the automobile. If probable cause must be shown, as
the Payton dicta suggests, see Payton v. New York, 445 \
U. S. 573, 587 (1980), I think it is clear that it existed here.
Officer Maples testified that he previously had made an arrest in a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off balloons
similar to the one at issue here. Other officers had told him
of such cases. Even if it were not generally known that a
balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics,
we have recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely
on his training and experience to draw inferences and make
deductions that might well elude an untrained person.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). We are
not advised of any innocent item that is commonly carried in
uninfiated, tied-off balloon such as the one Officer Maples
seized.
Accordingly, I concur in the Court's judgment as it is consistent with principles established by our prior decisions.

(CAB 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Truitt,
521 F. 2d 1174, 117fr..1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F. 2d
67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 983 (1973); United States v.
Drew, 451 F. 2d 230, 232-234 (CA5 1971).
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TEXAS, PETITIONER v. CLIFFORD JAMES BROWN
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APPEALS OF TEXAS
[April - , 1983]

with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
/
concurring in the judgment.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the warrantless seizure of respondent's balloon could not be justified
under the plain view doctrine because incriminating evidence
was not immediately apparent. This Court reverses, holding that even though the contents of the balloon were not visible to the officer, incriminating evidence was immediately
apparent because he had probable cause to believe the balloon contained an illicit substance. I agree with the Court
that contraband need not be visible in order for a plain view
seizure to be justified. I therefore concur in the conclusion
that the Texas Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment
more strictly than is required.
The plurality's explanation of our disposition of this case is, J
however, incomplete. It gives adequate consideration to our
cases holding that a closed container may not be opened without a warrant, even when the container is in plain view -and
the officer has probable cause to believe contraband is concealed within. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1
(1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979); United
States v. Ross, - - U. S. - - , - - (1982). Final determination of whether the trial court properly denied the suppression motion requires a more complete understanding of
the plain view doctrine, as well as the answer to a factual inJUSTICE STEVENS,
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quiry that remains open to the state court on remand.
Although our Fourth Amendment cases sometimes refer
indiscriminately to searches and seizures, there are important differences between the two that are relevant to the
plain view doctrine. The Amendment protects two different
interests of the citizen-the interest in retaining possession
of property and the interest in maintaining personal privacy.
A seizure threatens the former, a search the latter. As a
matter of timing, a seizure is usually preceded by a search,
but when a container is involved the converse is often true.
Significantly, the two protected interests are not always
present to the same extent; for example, the seizure of a
locked suitcase does not necessarily compromise the secrecy
of its contents, and the search of a stopped vehicle does not
necessarily deprive its owner of possession.
An object may be considered to be "in plain view" if it can
be seized without compromising any interest in privacy.
Since seizure of such an object threatens only the interest in
possession, circumstances diminishing that interest may justify exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's usual -requirements. Thus, if an item has been abandoned, neither Fourth
Amendment interest is implicated, and neither probable
cause nor a warrant is necessary to justify seizure. See
e. g., Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 241 (1960); cf.
United States v. Lisk, 522 F. 2d 228, 230 (7th Cir. 1975).
And if an officer has probable cause to believe that a publicly
situated item is associated with criminal activity, the interest
in possession is outweighed by the risk that such an item
might disappear or be put to its intended use before a warrant could be obtained. The officer may therefore seize it
without a warrant. See G.M. ·Leasing Corp. v. United
States, 429 U. S. 338, 354 (1975); Payton v. New York, 445
U. S. 573, 587 (1980). The "plain view" exception to the
warrant requirement is easy to understand and to apply in
cases in which no search is made and no intrusion on privacy
occurs.
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The Court's more difficult plain view cases, however, have
regularly arisen in two contexts that link the seizure with a
prior or subsequent search. The first is the situation in
which an officer who is executing a valid search for one item
seizes a different item. The Court has been sensitive to the
danger inherent in such a situation that officers will enlarge a
specific authorization, furnished by a warrant or an exigency,
into the equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and
seize at will. That danger is averted by strict attention to
two of the core requirements of plain view: seizing the item
must entail no significant additional invasion of privacy, and
at the time of seizure the officer must have probable cause to
connect the item with criminal behavior. See United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 465 (1932); cf. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 465-466 (1971).
The second familiar context is the situation in which an officer comes upon a container in plain view and wants both to
seize it and to examine its contents. In recent years, the
Court has spoken at some length about the latter act, e. g.,
Ross, supra; Chadwick, supra;. Sanders, supra, emphasizing
the Fourth Amendment privacy values implicated whenever
a container is opened. In this case, however, both the
search of a container (the balloon) and the antecedent seizure
are open to challenge. 1 In that regard, it more closely resembles Coolidge, supra. 2 All of these cases, however,
'In defending the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment before
this Court, the respondent did not rely upon a challenge to the search of
the balloon. I nevertheless believe it is necessary to elaborate upon the
distinction between the balloon's search and its seizure in this case in order
to clarify what the Court does and does not hold today. Moreover, it is not
clear to me whether, as a matter of Texas law, the respondent would still
be permitted to present an argument that the evidence should be suppressed because it was obtained after a search of the balloon. See infra,
n. 3.
2
Although Coolidge is not always thought of as a container case, the
Court was required to confront New Hampshire's separate attempts to jus-
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demonstrate that the constitutionality of a container search is
not automatically determined by the constitutionality of the
prior seizure. See Chadwick, supra, at 13--14, n. 8; Sanders, supra, at 761-762. Separate inquiries are necessary,
taking into account the separate interests at stake.
If a movable container is in plain view, seizure does not implicate any privacy interests. Therefore, if there is probable
cause to believe it contains contraband, the owner's possessory interest in the container must yield to society's interest
in making sure that the contraband does not vanish during
the time it would take to obtain a warrant. The item may be
seized temporarily. It does not follow, however, that the
container may be opened on the spot. Once the container is
in custody, there is no risk that evidence will be destroyed.
Some inconvenience to the officer is entailed by requiring him
to obtain a warrant before opening the container, but that
alone does not excuse the duty to go before a neutral magistrate. Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 15 (1948);
'McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 455 (1948). As
JusTICE PowELL emphasizes, ante, at 1-2, the Warrant
Clause embodies our government's historical commitment to
bear the burden of inconvenience. Exigent circumstances
must be shown before the Constitution will entrust an individual's privacy to the judgment of a single police officer.
In this case, I have no doubt concerning the propriety of
the officer's warrantless seizure of the balloon. For the reasons stated by JUSTICES POWELL and REHNQUIST, I agree
that the police officer invaded no privacy interest in order to
see the balloon, and that when he saw it he had probable
cause to believe it contained drugs. But before the balloon's
tify both its warrantless seizure of a container, an immobilized automobile,
see id., at 464-473, and its subsequent warrantless searches of the container's interior, see id., at 458-464.
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contents could be used as evidence against the respondent,
the state also had to justify opening it without a warrant. 3 I
can perceive two potential justifications. First, it is entirely
possible that what the officer saw in the car's glove compartment, coupled with his observation of respondent and the
contents of his pockets, provided probable cause to believe
that contraband was located somewhere in the car-and not
merely in the one balloon at issue. If so, then under Ross,
supra, which was not decided until after the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals reviewed this case, it was permissible to examine the contents of any container in the car, including this
balloon.
Alternatively, the balloon could be one of those rare singlepurpose containers which "by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance."
Sanders, supra, at 764-765, n. 13. Whereas a suitcase or a
paper bag may contain an almost infinite variety of items, a
balloon of this kind might be used only to transport drugs.
Viewing it where he did could have given the officer a degree
of certainty that is equivalent to the plain view of the heroin
itself. If that be true, I would conclude that the plain view
doctrine supports the search as well as the seizure even
though the contents of the balloon were not actually visible to
the officer. 4
This reasoning leads me to the conclusion that the Fourth
3

Arguably, as a matter of Texas law the respondent has waived his
right to demand such a justification. That is, of course, an issue for the
Texas courts.
.
• Conversely, the fact that an object is visible does not automatically
mean that it is in plain view in the sense that no invasion of privacy is required to seize it. This case does not require elaboration of what the
Fourth Amendment demands before an officer may seize a visible item that
he could not reach without, for example, entering a private home or destroying a valuable container. See Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S. 1, 5
(1932).

I
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Amendment would not require exclusion of the balloon's contents in this case if, but only if, there was probable cause to
search the entire vehicle or there was virtual certainty that
the balloon contained a controlled substance. 5 Neither of
these fact-bound inquiries was made by the Texas courts, and
neither should be made by this Court in the first instance.
Moreover, it may be that on remand the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals will find those inquiries unnecessary because the respondent may have waived his right to demand
them. See supra, n. 3. I therefore concur in the judgment.

5
Sometimes there can be greater certainty about the identity of a substance within a container than about the identity of a substance that is actually visible. One might actually see a white powder without realizing
that it is heroin, but be virtually certain a balloon contains such a substance
in a particular context. It seems to me that in evaluating whether a person's privacy interests are infringed, "virtual certainty'' is a more meaningful indicator than visibility.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
._Tustice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins,
concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the
plurality's opinion relating to the application in this case of \
the plain view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do
not join the plurality's opinion because it goes well beyond
the application of the exception. As I read the opinion, it
appears
to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment than is justified by the language and
purpose of that Amendment. In dissent in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote
eloquently:
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the
text and context and historic content of the Fourth
Amendment. . . . When [that] Amendment outlawed
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the
very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all
the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only
exceptions justified by absolute necessity." I d., at 70.
To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause
cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected
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disagreement among Justices as to the extent to which the
Clause defines the reasonableness standard of the Amendment. In one of my earliest opinions, United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972), I cited
Justice Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dissent in emphasizing the
importance of the Warrant Clause. I d., at 316. Although I
would not say that exceptions can be justified only by "absolute necessity," 1 I stated that they were "few in number and
carefully delineated." Id., at 318. This has continued to be
my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U. S. 753, 759 (1979). It is a view frequently repeated by
this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798,
825 (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978) l
(unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 U. S. 30, 34
(1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 52~529 (1967);
Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958).
This case involves an application of the plain view exception, first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The
plurality today states that this opinion "has never been ex- \
pressly adopted by a majority of this Court." Ante, at 6.
Whatever my view might have been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late date to imply criticism of its
articulation of this exception. It has been accepted generally for over a decade. 2 Moreover, it seems unnecessary to
1
I have considered the automobile exception, for example, as one clearly
justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, e. g., Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 760-761 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U. S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida·-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring).
2
See, e. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1353, 1356-1357 (CA9
1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F. 2d 554, 55&-560 (CA11982); United
States v. Tolerton, 669 F . 2d 652, 653-655 (CAlO), cert. denied,- U.S.
(1982); United States v. Antill, 615 F. 2d 648, 649 (CA5) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F . 2d
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cast doubt on Coolidge in this case. Its plurality formulation
is dispositive of the question before us.
Respondent Brown does not dispute that Officer Maples'
initial intrusion was lawful. Brown also concedes that the
discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it
was observed in the course of a lawful inspection of the front
seat area of the automobile. If probable cause must be
shown, as the Payton dicta suggest, see Payton v. New /
York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980), I think it is clear that it existed here. Officer Maples testified that he previously had
made an arrest in a case where narcotics were carried in tiedoff balloons similar to the one at issue here. Other officers
had told him of such cases. Even if it were not generally
known that a balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics, we have recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might well elude an
untrained person. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411,
418 (1981). We are not advised of any innocent item that is
commonly carried in uninfiated, tied-off balloon such as the
one Officer Maples seized.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment as it is consistent /
with principles established by our prior decisions.

j

1309, 1313-1314 (CA5 1978); United States v. Williams , 523 F. 2d 64, 61H37
(CA8 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Truitt ,
521 F. 2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. Pacelli , 470 F. 2d
67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 983 (1973); United States v.
Drew, 451 F . 2d 230, 232-234 (CA5 1971).
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